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ABSTRACT
The dissertation studies two specialized labor markets: fashion and science. The
essays examine two separate topics in the context of a specialized market. The topics
are hiring practice and its consequences for diversity and inclusion and the role of federal
investment in a specialized market and its effect on total employment.
The first essay provides empirical evidence of race-based hiring quotas in a competitive
labor market. Using novel data on the hiring of fashion models for high-end runway shows,
I find that Black and Asian models are less likely to be hired if a designer retains more
models of the same race from previous shows. The substitution effect between minority
newcomers and incumbents of the same race is larger than the substitution effect between
a random newcomer and incumbent or a newcomer and incumbent who are White. The
substitution effect for minority models is also larger than the same effect derived from a
simulation of race-blind hiring. The credentials of Black and Asian newcomers improve
with the increase in the percentage of rehired models of the same race in a show. The
findings suggest that designers choose a set number of minority models per show and
become more selective of minority newcomers when they retain more models of the same
race from previous shows.
In the second essay, based on the joint work with Margaret C. Levenstein and Ja-
son Owen-Smith, I use the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), a large
stimulus package passed into law to combat the Great Recession, to estimate the effect
of R&D and science spending on local employment. Unlike most fiscal stimuli, the R&D
and science portion of ARRA did not target counties with poor economic conditions but
rather was awarded following a peer review process, or based on innovative potential and
research infrastructure. We find that, over the program’s five-year disbursement period,
vii
each one million USD in R&D and science spending was associated with twenty-seven
additional jobs. The estimated job-year cost is about $15,000.
viii
CHAPTER I
“We’ve Already Hired A Black Girl”: Empirical
Evidence of Quotas in the Fashion Industry
1.1 Introduction
Does an increase in minority representation mean less biased employment? A more
diverse workforce is viewed by many as an indicator of fair hiring practices. Consistently,
many employers face increasing pressure to raise the proportion of minorities hired. This
paper suggests that this pressure creates incentives for race-based hiring. It emphasizes
that increasing minority representation in the workforce is not sufficient to guarantee fair
hiring practices and can generate a quota effect.
This paper empirically tests whether the race of retained workers affects the selection
of a new employee. First, I examine whether the racial composition of an existing work-
force changes the probability of a minority hire. If an employer has a certain number of
“minority” spots in mind, the number of retained workers reduces the probability of a
new hire of the same race. Then I compare my findings with race-blind hiring. Under
the race-blind hiring, the number of minority incumbents in a firm has the same effect
on all newcomers, regardless of race, and it does not differ from the effect of White in-
cumbents on all newcomers. I simulate hiring patterns in a race-blind environment and
compare the effect of minority incumbents on minority newcomers under two scenarios –
race-blind hiring in the simulated data and hiring patterns in the fashion industry data.
Finally, I examine whether the credentials of newly hired employees vary with the racial
1
composition of the incumbent workforce. If the hiring is race-blind, then, all other things
being equal, the credentials of newcomers should not vary among employers with different
racial compositions of incumbent workers. If race matters in hiring, the employer with
many minority incumbents has fewer “minority vacancies” and becomes more selective
of minority candidates. In other words, if race matters, the variation in availability of
“minority spots” drives the competition minority applicants face. Thus, the employers
with few “minority spots” select minority workers with stronger credentials.
I test these predictions using a novel data set on the hiring of models for high-end
fashion runway shows. The fashion industry hiring displays some unique features that
allow me to address whether quota-based hiring can arise in a competitive market under
non-legislative pressure from the public. The dissimilarity between the labor market for
fashion models and the general labor market is a virtue because it provides an opportu-
nity for examining the quota effect, which is harder to measure in other settings. First,
hiring choices of designers for runway shows are easily observed. Second, the labor mar-
ket for fashion runway shows is open and competitive. It is not subject to affirmative
action legislation, and most jobs last less than a few days, making firing costs negligible.
Third, education and experience are not crucial for runway hiring, negating the effect
of premarket discrimination and group differences in education and experience on hiring
decisions.1 Fourth, the skills are observable, alleviating concerns about the use of race
by employers as a proxy for unobservable skills. Fifth, networks, referrals, and in-group
preferences of workers – all-powerful social phenomena affecting racial composition of a
workforce – are less prominent in runway hiring due to large power distance between a
designer and a model.2 Modeling for a fashion runway does not involve teamwork or
extensive communication among workers further reducing concerns about the effect of
in-group preferences on hiring.3 Finally, sequential recruitment and importance of rela-
tional contracts allow me to use the number of rehired minority workers as a predictor
1“Fashion modeling...has no formal entry criteria based on credentials such as diplomas or certificates.
There are very few informal barriers like cultural or social capital...” [Mears, 2011a].
2Mears [2008] points in her study that “models hold the least power in this market; they have the
weakest sense of judging criteria and the greatest replaceability.”
3“Modeling, like artistic careers, consists of short-term contractual ties, in which employment is on a
per-project basis”[Mears, 2008]. See Mears [2011a] for detailed description of modeling work.
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for the number of vacancies open to minority newcomers.
The hiring of models for a runway show takes place in two stages: the rehiring4 of
models from previous seasons who performed well and are available for the current season,
followed by the search for newcomers to fill the remaining spots. The combination of the
uncertainty of customer demand, the uncertainty in the initial quality of workers, and
the lack of signaling mechanisms, such as education, training, or references result in a
form of path dependency: the number of models retained by a designer sets a constraint
on the number of newcomers.
I examine whether, in a runway show, the number of newly hired minority models
differs systematically depending on the number of retained models of the same race. This
result is contrasted against a simulation of race-blind hiring in the same context. Then,
I test whether the credentials of minority newcomers differ based on the percentage of
rehired models of the same race in a show.
I find that the number of minority models retained from previous seasons dispropor-
tionately affects newcomers of the same race. The average reduction in Asian newcomers
associated with an additional Asian incumbent is almost six times larger than a similar
effect from a rehired White model. The effect of Black and Hispanic rehires on Black
and Hispanic newcomers is two and a half and four times larger than the effect of an
additional rehired White model. In contrast, White newcomers are affected equally by a
rehired model of any race. The magnitude of this effect is similar to that of an additional
White incumbent on Asian, Black, and Hispanic newcomers. Next, I simulate race-blind
hiring in the same context and compare the estimates from simulated data to the main
result. The main empirical result from the actual data is substantially higher than the
substitution effect for minority newcomers and rehires under the simulated race-blind hir-
ing. The difference between these results alleviates concerns about the non-replacement
and other supply issues that can create a disproportionately large substitution effect
between minority newcomers and incumbents. Finally, I compare the portfolios of new-
4I use the words “rehire” and “retain” interchangeably. Although runway contracts are show-specific,
previous collaborations between a designer and a model reduce uncertainty about the model’s future
performance and give her an advantage over new hires [Mears, 2011a].
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comers in shows with higher and lower percentages of retained models of the same race.
I find that Black and Asian newcomers in the shows with high percentage of Black and
Asian rehires consistently outperform their peers in the shows with low percentage of
Black and Asian rehires. The former group dominates in almost all portfolio items.5 The
results for White newcomers are mixed, with no clear relationship between the average
quality of a newcomer portfolio and the percentage of rehired White models in a show.
My study contributes to the personnel economics literature on organizational demo-
graphics and hiring.6 Multiple studies tie demographic composition of the current work-
force to firms’ hiring choices. Dustmann et al. [2015] use the share of minority workers
in a group as a proxy for referrals and show that this share is positively related to the
probability of hiring from the same minority group. Oyer and Schaefer [2012] find that
U.S. law firms hire disproportionately from law schools that are geographically close and
have more of its alumni as partners. Giuliano et al. [2009] find that managers dispropor-
tionately hire employees of the same race. These results are due to social networks and
in-group preferences and three studies find positive associations between the demographic
characteristics of an existing workforce and those of new hires.
I find the opposite: an increase in the number of retained workers of a particular
minority group reduces the share of new hires from that group. The discrepancy can be
explained by the differences in settings and relationships between current workers and new
hires. Designers do not use referrals or networks of retained models to hire new models
because of the large power differences. In-group preferences are also muted because
worker communication and teamwork are limited: from initial casting to runway show,
models do not depend on interactions with fellow models to do their job. In addition,
the difference between retained and newly hired workers is not as substantial as it is in
other occupations. In the aforementioned studies, a worker has some decision-making
power over new hires (he is either a hiring manager or a worker suggesting a candidate),
whereas in runway hiring, a rehired model does not gain any knowledge of or authority
5 I compare models based on the number of lookbooks (a collection of photographs representing a
clothing line), editorials (artistic fashion photography in fashion magazines), magazine covers, catalogs,
and advertising campaigns.
6 For a survey of the personnel economics literature on hiring, see Oyer and Schaefer [2010].
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over the hiring of her peers.7
This study complements the broad organizational demographics literature in sociol-
ogy,8 which focuses on the demographic composition of teams or organizational units in
relation to performance, turnover, innovation potential, conflict, and so on. For exam-
ple, Sørensen [2004] shows that turnover increases when same-race representation in the
workplace declines. In general, this strand of literature analyzes relatively stable teams
and organizational units. The decision about the addition of a new member to a team
or organizational unit is either designed as random (in lab experiments) or assumed to
be exogenous to the race composition of the current group. I find that this assumption
does not hold in runway hiring; rather, the race of a new addition to a group depends
on the racial composition of the existing workforce. Moreover, the racial composition of
the existing workforce affects the credentials of the new hires (i.e., a larger number of
retained minority workers raises the bar for the newcomers of the same race).
In addition to the personnel economics literature on hiring and organizational demog-
raphy, this study is also related to the literature on labor market segmentation [Reich
et al., 1973], the research on affirmative action as quotas [Welch, 1976], the policy evalu-
ation of affirmative action legislation [Leonard, 1990; Oyer and Schaefer, 2002; DeLeire,
2000; Acemoglu and Angrist, 2001], and the theory of tokenism [Kanter, 1977a,b]. Similar
to the studies on tokenism, I examine the ratios of minority workers in an organization
and the differential treatment of a worker based on minority status. Many of the core
topics in tokenism literature – including heightened visibility of a minority worker, ex-
aggerated differences between minority and majority workers, and the assimilation of
minority workers into stereotypes about their race [Kanter, 1977b] – are present in fash-
ion. However, I focus instead on employment outcomes between minority workers who
face a prospective employer with many retained workers of the same race and those who
face an employer with few or no such workers.
7Mears [2011a] writes about the hiring process. Clients (editors, photographers, casting directors,
designers, and stylists) “are charged with the selection of models for designers and fashion companies...
stylists and casting directors wield considerable clout, makeup artists the least, and designers usually
make the final verdict on which models to hire.”
8 Williams and O’Reilly III [1998] review field and lab studies in organizational demography carried
out by sociologists.
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The narrow context of the study differentiates it from the labor segmentation liter-
ature, as well. Given the average pay, job security, returns to experience, and length
of tenure, modeling belongs to the secondary market for everyone, regardless of race.9
While my findings hint at a labor market segmentation with minority models competing
in small niche markets with peers of the same race, no evidence of a minority overrepre-
sentation in fashion exists. Contrary to the predictions in the labor market segmentation
literature, White workers dominate this secondary labor market.
The hiring of models for runway shows is not subject to affirmative action legislation,
making it an interesting case of race-based quotas arising in response to public pressure
rather than to a threat of legal action. While my findings suggest that the allocation of
minority workers in fashion is reminiscent of self-enforced quotas, the evidence does not
support other fundamentals used in affirmative action papers, such as the difference in
skills between minority and majority applicants and the allocation of low-skilled minority
applicants to high-skilled jobs. The analysis in this study focuses on a narrow subset of
hires in the fashion industry that does not provide significant variation in skill.
This paper is closely related to the small number of studies on non-legislated quotas
[Fryer, 2009]. The non-legislated quotas are notoriously difficult to show. Dezso˝ et al.
[2016] document patterns in top management team composition that are consistent with
a quota for women but, critically, do not address non-replacement, self-selection via
fertility decisions, labor supply (hours and occupational choice), skill gap - all important
alternatives that can generate similar team composition. Even when data on the supply
side are available, as in the recent case of Harvard v. Students for Fair Admissions,
economics experts can come to different conclusions regarding the existence of quotas.10
Finally, quite important is the fact that market participants share a belief that de-
signers enforce quotas for minority models.11 Mears [2011a] and Mears [2010] present
9 The details about the working conditions, risks, contractual arrangements, and the costs of “looking
like a model” are in Chapters 2 and 3 of [Mears, 2011a].
10 See expert reports in Arcidiacono [2018] and Card [2017].
11 Teeman [2013] quotes Chanel Iman, a Black model, “Designers have told me, “We already found
one black girl. We don’t need you any more.””
Mears [2011a] quotes David, New York casting director, “There always has to be at least one because
they don’t want to offend any group, you know. So I always try to get one Asian, one Black, and also I
think it does a service to a designer if we are trying,..”
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descriptive evidence of quotas and interviews with minority models, e.g. Teeman [2013],
provide insightful anecdotes.
1.2 The Fashion Industry
The fashion industry is an important part of the global economy, spanning the pro-
duction of textiles, the design and manufacturing of clothes, advertising, and retail. This
study focuses on a commonly known form of advertising in fashion – runway shows. A
fashion show is an expensive12 and elaborate advertising event that promotes the sales of
a collection of garments designed for a brand. Runway shows take place in many cities
across the world, but historically the most established and well-known fashion brands
show their collections twice a year in New York, London, Milan, and Paris. Each of the
four cities hosts runway shows for one week in September for Spring/Summer collections
and in February for Fall/Winter collections. The month-long series of events is known as
the Big Four Fashion Weeks. Traditionally, brands show their collections in one of the
four cities, which is also their headquarters.13
The majority of fashion brands are eponymous and have had the same head designer
since inception. A change of head designer is rare and usually reflects succession after a
designer’s death or retirement. For example, Sarah Burton, Alexander McQueen’s main
design aide, stepped in as the head designer for his eponymous brand after McQueen’s
suicide in 2010. Smaller brands tend to disappear once the designer leaves the profession.
Many prolific designers head several brands; for example, Karl Lagerfeld is the head
designer for Chanel, Fendi, and the Karl Lagerfeld brand, though each brand has its own
unique aesthetics.
A designer is involved in many aspects of a runway show because runways generate
visibility, carry their name, and are a major display of their work. The designers of
smaller brands select runway models themselves. Larger brands employ casting directors
12 The cost of a basic runway during New York Fashion Week is around US$200,000. The top brands
can spend upward of US$1 million [Mau, 2014].
13 There are some exceptions when the show is moved to a different fashion capital for cost-saving
purposes or to advertise a forthcoming store opening in that city.
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and supporting designers who are involved in model screening and casting. However,
all personnel of large brands are working toward a common goal of implementing the
head designer’s vision, which leads to continuity in preferences for runway models, even
if changes to the brand’s team occur over time.
1.2.1 Why Fashion Models?
Runway hiring represents a small share of the total labor market and has unique
features that set it apart from traditional forms of employment. I use these unique
features to isolate the quota effect and shed new light on labor markets in general.
The labor market for fashion models is fast-paced and displays high churn rates. On
average, modeling careers span six seasons, or three years, and are to a labor economist
what fruit flies are to a geneticist. High entry-exit rates and multiple employment events
within one’s career generate sufficient variation for estimating hiring patterns by designers
in relatively short panels.
Group differences is the fundamental problem in estimating the effect of race on
hiring. Runway hiring stands out, since formal education is not required and experience
is often an impediment. Few newcomers have networks that can guarantee a spot on a
high-end runway, thus alleviating concerns about the effect of networks on hiring [Oyer
and Schaefer, 2012]. The power distance between designers and models make referrals
uncommon and not an important source for finding new employees, unlike evidence in
Dustmann et al. [2015]. The setting, therefore, reduces concerns about group differences
in education, experience, training, or networks.
The setting also alleviates concerns about the employer’s use of race as a proxy for
unobservable skills [Phelps, 1972]. The skills required for the runway modeling are ob-
servable during castings. A fashion model does not search for, schedule, or negotiate
payment in any of her jobs, further reducing the importance of education, training, and
employer’s use of race for inference [Mears, 2011a]. Runway employment lasts, at maxi-
mum, several days. It does not carry any firing costs or long-term commitments that may
affect differentially the hiring of employees of different races [DeLeire, 2000; Acemoglu
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and Angrist, 2001]. Furthermore, fashion runways do not require teamwork or communi-
cation among models, reducing the importance of “common language” for performance
outcomes [Lang, 1986].
1.2.2 The Hiring of Models During Fashion Weeks
The hiring process differs for models who have never worked for the brand before and
those who have. New hires go through several rounds of screenings, castings, and fittings
before they walk the runway. First, a modeling agency sends a stack of composition cards
(comp cards)14 for all the models who have the potential to be employed by the designer.
The comp cards of all newcomers are generally sent as designers are always seeking new
faces and the agencies are betting on newcomers’ potential (they would not be signed
with an agency otherwise). As the models’ careers advance, the agency reassesses their
“employability” based on the industry demand for them.
After screening thousands of comp cards, designers invite selected models to castings.
Some brands begin with “cattle-call” castings in which all models are invited. When
models are selected, the designer contacts their agencies to “place an option”15 and to
inform the agents about follow-up castings and fittings. The options are either converted
into booking or canceled in days or even hours before the show [Godart and Mears, 2009].
After multiple castings, from go-sees16 to fit-to-confirm, the runway lineup is selected.
The hiring process differs for models who have worked for the designer before. The
designer “requests”17 a model directly from their agency, who then join at a later stage
in the screening process, usually during fittings.18
Designers face a trade-off when selecting models for the runway between the uncer-
tainty about any one model’s performance and the quest for new faces. They turn to
14A composition card for a runway show includes the pictures of a model (usually a headshot and a
full-length body shot) and her statistics (height, dress size, shoe size, and measurements). It also includes
contact details of the agent. A comp card of Samantha Archibald from Major agency is in Figure 1.1.
15 According to Godart and Mears [2009], an option is “a hold on the model’s future availability in
rank order of interest, from first(strong) to third (weak).” For more information on option mechanism
in runway hiring, see pp.681-683 op.cit.
16A meeting with the client, not necessarily for a specific job [Mears, 2011a].
17An invitation for a casting extended to specific models.
18 For details about model bookings, casting process, “requests”, and “options”, see Mears [2008],
Chapter 3 of Mears [2011a], and Safronova et al. [2017].
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the new faces when “requested” models retire, change careers, take a break for school,
or start a family. The new faces also fill in the spots of models who did not do well the
previous season, since they have more upward potential.
Monetary compensation19 is not the main driver of model participation in runway
show, designers pay in prestige. Aspiring models walk the runway to gain reputational
capital, while established models do so to maintain their relevance and renew a relational
contract with a designer, which is a prerequisite for high-paying advertising jobs. There
is a large variation in pay based on model status. For instance, an established model who
brings the publicity and spotlight to the runway can be paid more than US$10,000 per
show, but these instances are infrequent. On average, during New York Fashion Week,
big brands pay models approximately $1,000, and small brands pay $200, before taxes
and agency commission (usually 20%), for all castings, fittings, and runway work [Mears,
2011b]. Designers in the other fashion capitals pay less [Mears, 2011a]. This pay scale
is fairly recent, as five years ago designers did not pay models for runway work, or they
paid in trade (clothes they wore on the runway) [Odell, 2013]. Some designers still do not
pay, pay less than what was agreed on, or delay payments [Mears, 2011a]. The modeling
agencies transfer all risks of a nonpayment to the model [Mears, 2011a], as they are in
a difficult position in negotiations with the designer about model pay. The commission
to the agency from a model’s runway booking is small compared with the monetary and
reputational value of a business relationship with the designer.
The wages paid by a designer to fashion models constitute a small percentage of
overall runway costs. A simple calculation suggests that a designer holding a basic show
featuring 25 models who are paid US $200 will spend less than 3% of the total runway
cost of US $200,000. The combined pay of all models will be less than what a make-up
artist will receive for styling models in the same show [Mau, 2014].
Fashion modeling displays a typical tournament structure, with many contenders at
the bottom and few incumbents at the top in terms of earnings and prestige. The supply
of new models exceeds demand, especially for the top brands. The anecdotal evidence in
19 For details about model earnings, see Chapter 2 in Mears [2011a], Mears [2011b], Nisita [2013] and
Odell [2013].
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Mears [2011a], fashion forums (e.g., The Fashion Spot), and popular press suggests that
designers have difficulty in choosing among many worthy candidates.
1.2.3 The Lack of Diversity on the Runway
The fashion industry is often criticized for its labor practices, including the employ-
ment of underage models, the pressure on workers to lose weight, inconsistent and low
pay, and bad working conditions. This study specifically addresses the lack of diversity
on fashion runways.
The fashion industry as a whole, and many designers in particular, are often criticized
by the media about the lack of minority models on runways and in other forms of adver-
tising.20 This issue is so prominent that it spurred biannual reports about diversity on
the runways during major Fashion Weeks (e.g. Tai [2017], Sauers [2013]). Twice a year,
the Fashion Spot and Jezebel websites count models of color on every major runway.
They then publish simple statistics and commentary about the diversity on the runway,
often naming “the best” and “the worst” designers in terms of minority representation.
Major news outlets often use these reports to single out designers who do not hire or hire
too few minority models to walk in their runway shows, thus creating negative publicity
for a fashion brand. While the intentions of the editors are good, the focus on counting
minority models oversimplifies the problem and its solution. If having no fewer models
than other designers makes bad press go away, the industry evolves by introducing an
acceptable number of minority models per runway as an unspoken guideline.
The emphasis on numbers is echoed by industry insiders. The Council of Fashion
Designers of America (CFDA), a trade association of American designers, included Di-
versity Guidelines in its regular address issued before the New York Fashion Week [von
Furstenberg and Kolb, 2016]. Balance Diversity, a small grass-roots organization with a
mission to increase diversity on fashion runways, wrote the guidelines in 2014. Balance
Diversity drew the attention of industry insiders after its founder, Bethann Hardison, a
former model, mailed letters to the organizers of Big Four Fashion Weeks with a list of
20 Safronova et al. [2017], Pilkington [2007], and Moore-Karim [2016] are a few of the many articles
on the issue.
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brands that had hired none or few models of color for their Fashion Week runways. A
year later, the organization sent a letter commending the industry and designers for their
efforts in improving diversity (see Figure 1.2). Its metric of success is the increase in
the count of minority models walking in shows. The Model Alliance, the Black Models
Matter campaign, and other efforts to increase diversity also focus on increasing minority
representation on the runway [Pilkington, 2007; Moore-Karim, 2016]. These campaigns,
too, focus on targeting the brands with few minority models in their shows. The emphasis
on the numbers creates incentives for hiring by the numbers, or the quota effect, without
any legislation mandating it.
1.3 Data
I collect data on runway hiring from several online sources. Figure 1.3 shows the
structure of the data. The main data comprise a list of models who walked in the runway
shows during the Big Four Fashion Weeks from 2000 to 2017. The first source of data
is the runway section of Vogue.com. The website provides complete picture galleries of
designer collections shown during Fashion Weeks. A model name is tagged in the picture,
listed in the caption, or both. The show locations are also included in the source code
of a collection’s webpage. Vogue.com has data on the runway shows held as early as
1991, but the data before 2000 is incomplete. I supplement and cross-check the data on
show-model pairs from Vogue.com with the data from Models.com. Figure 1.4 shows the
screenshots of the model data for the Prada Spring 2017 collection from Models.com (on
the left) and Vogue.com.
The dataset represents the middle and the right tail of model distribution in terms
of prestige. The aspiring models who never made it to a single show are not in the main
dataset. I do not have the data on the selection at the scouting21 or the casting stage. I
collect recent data on the listings by the top modeling agencies to partially alleviate this
problem. The data approximate the racial composition of a pool of aspiring models and
21The discovery by an agent (often on the street, in a cafe, or at a mall), followed by the model’s
signing of a contract with an agency.
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provide a conjecture about the supply side of the modeling labor market.
The model-show pairs are supplemented with the portfolio data from the Fashion
Model Directory (FMD), a collection of model profiles, similar to LinkedIn in its purpose,
serving people with careers in fashion. The site lists the details of past employment and
other credentials of fashion models, including physical characteristics (dress size, shoe size,
height, eye color, hair color), date and place of birth, nationality, and work experience
(lookbooks, covers, advertisements, catalogs, and editorials). I match the FMD data to
the main data using the model’s name. The names are not standardized in the raw data,
so I created a cross-walk to link the two datasets. The data on agencies representing
models come from the FMD and the picture captions from Vogue.com.
I collected the data on the models’ race with the help of workers on Amazon Mechan-
ical Turk (MTurk). The answers from MTurk are linked to model names by design.
1.3.1 Defining Race
Race is a complex construct. This paper employs a narrow view of race that does
not include self-identification or racial attributes not evident in physical appearance. It
treats race as a brief and subjective evaluation of observable physical traits by a collective
of people other than the self. This view of race is limited and skewed. It is also prevalent
in social interactions and important economic decisions, including hiring. A minority, in
this context, is someone who is different than the rest of the workforce in the way that
they look, to an employer and customer.
The setting, fashion runways, limits phenotypical traits of race even further. Little
variability in height, weight, and, because I only sample women, gender leaves skin color
and facial features as the only characteristics determining race in this context.22 Yet
these narrow attributes of race are sufficient to generate important differences in hiring
decisions.
I do not take part in determining race; rather, the MTurk workers determine the race
of all fashion models in the data. I instructed the workers to open a link with a picture
22Figure 1.5 illustrates this point by showing models Yue Han, Julia van Os, and Jasmine Tookes walk
in the Carolina Herreira Spring/Summer 2017 runway show.
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of a model and to key in race as Asian, Black, Hispanic,23 White, or Other. The models
who are visually non-White but do not look Black, Asian, or Hispanic, are classified as
Other. Many models are biracial. It is up to MTurk workers to choose one of the five
categories for models of two or more races.
I cross-check MTurk data using several sources. The FMD provides data on national-
ity, hair color, and eye color as a part of the model portfolio. I also use articles in popular
press, such as the Top 50 Black Models in Vogue Italia [D’Angelo, 2016], to verify race.
1.3.2 Descriptive Analysis
The main data contain 113,929 appearances of a model in a runway show. The
appearances span 4,329 shows by 395 brands in four locations (New York, London, Milan,
and Paris) over 35 seasons and feature 3,034 unique models. The main data does not
include the first season of each brand; that is, the first season is omitted from analysis
because, by construction, every model in the first show is new to a brand. Because I am
interested in the relationship between the number of newcomers by race and the racial
composition of retained models, the inaugural shows do not provide any variation.
Table 1.1 summarizes the location of shows in the data. The largest number of shows,
1,581 (37%), take place during New York Fashion Week. New York is closely followed
by Paris, with 1,345 (31%) shows. Milan and London hosted 886 (20%) and 517 (12%)
shows in 2000-2017.
Table 1.2 shows the summary statistics on models’ race. White models dominate the
sample, accounting for 2,544 (84%) of unique names. The same statistics for Black, Asian,
Hispanic, and Other models are 236 (8%), 185 (6%), 53 (2%), and 16 (1%), respectively.
Tables 1.3 and 1.4 highlight the difference in models’ portfolios based on race. I
regress a number of portfolio items, such as the number of magazine covers, editorials, or
23Hispanic is an ethnicity, not a race. Still, I separate Hispanic models from the rest of the sample.
My definition of Hispanic is narrow and differs from traditional definitions based on Latin American
heritage. The MTurk instructions specify that Hispanic, in this context, refers to Hispanic models who
cannot be visually classified as White, Black, or Asian. For the purposes of this paper and in the eyes of
a casting director and a customer White Hispanics Gisele Bu¨ndchen and Adriana Lima are White and
Black Hispanics Joan Smalls and Sessilee Lopez are Black.
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advertising campaigns on model’s race. The general form of these regressions is:
Pi,t = Asiani +Blacki +Hispi +Otheri + τt + γc + αb + εi,
where Pi,t is the number of editorials, advertising campaigns, or other items in model i’s
portfolio in season t, τt is season fixed effect, γc is city fixed effect, αb is brand fixed effect,
and εi is an error term clustered by model ID.
All regressions in Table 1.3 are at the model-season level and include city, season, and
brand fixed effects, except for the last regression, which is at the model-city level and
includes city fixed effects. There is no statistical difference between White and Asian
models in terms of age, number of lookbooks, covers, catalogs, ads, shows per season,
or the representation by a top agency.24 Asian models have more editorials per season
than White models. Black and Hispanic models have fewer editorials, covers, and shows
per season and are approximately 20% less likely to be represented by a top agency than
White models. Models classified as Other are younger and have fewer lookbooks, covers,
catalogs, and advertising campaigns per season than White models.
Table 1.4 contains a comparison of models of different races at the model level using
characteristics that are time-invariant in the data. Similar to the model-season regres-
sions, Asian models are similar to White models on many characteristics; the only excep-
tions are smaller shoe and dress size,25 more editorials over the length of their careers,
and shorter average career. Black models differ from White models in that they have a
smaller dress size, larger shoe size, and fewer shows during their careers. Hispanic models
have fewer covers and longer careers and models classified as Other race have fewer look-
books, covers, catalogs, and shows over the length of their careers than White models.
Like Asian models, models classified as Other have shorter average careers. There are no
statistically significant differences in height or rehiring rate across models of all races.
Figure 1.6 shows the percentage of appearances by White, Black, and Asian models
24 IMG, Women, Elite, and Next are classified as top agencies. They summarily represent models in
45% of all appearances in the data. They have offices in all four fashion capitals, with the exception of
Women which does not have a London office. The number of appearances managed by the next largest
agency, Viva, is less than a half the number represented by Next, the smallest top agency.
25In fashion, smaller shoe size and dress size are considered more advantageous.
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by city over time. The minority representation on the runways increases incrementally
over time in all cities with the most gains take place in the mid-2000s.
Table 1.5 presents the summary statistics on race at the show level. It breaks down the
count and percentage of models in the show by race and type of employment (newcomer
or rehire). The statistics show high levels of turnover from one season to the next.
More than half the models walking in an average show, regardless of race, are new to
the brand. Fashion is a fast-paced industry preoccupied with novelty and youth, and the
labor market for models reflects this. The other reasons for high turnover is a tournament
structure of the labor market with few high earners and many hopefuls who are dropped
by the agencies if they do not “make it” after a few seasons. The majority of shows are
dominated by White models (i.e. 86% of models in an average show are White), and 11%
of shows have a White-only cast. Only 20 shows in the sample have minority majority
casts, all of which took place in 2008 or later.
1.4 Empirical Strategy and Results
1.4.1 Empirical Strategy
I show two main results. First, I find that the substitution effect, a negative relation-
ship between the number of newcomers and the number of retained models of the same
race, is several times larger for minority models than for White models. I proceed to
show that a substitution effect of this magnitude is inconsistent with race-blind hiring.
Second, I show that minority newcomers in shows with many rehired models of the same
race have a stronger portfolio than newcomers in the shows with few rehired models of
the same race.
Runway hiring exhibits strong path dependency, especially within a brand. When
selected to walk for a brand, a model is likely to be invited to walk for the brand again.
The outcome of the first appearance reduces the uncertainty about customer demand and
model ability. She also skips initial screening and “cattle call” castings in the upcoming
seasons. Her subsequent participation, however, is not known to the public until the next
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season’s runway. Even if she did well on the runway the first time, there are any number
of reasons why she may not be rehired. By the next season, she may have quit modeling
because of career change, fertility decisions, or college. If she was successful the last
season, she may have conflicts in her Fashion Weeks schedule and less-known designers
may not get a chance to rebook her in the current season.
In general, the models do not know who will join them on the runway and can not
adjust their labor supply accordingly. The number of models retained from previous sea-
sons reduces the demand for new hires. I examine whether the large number of minority
rehires disproportionately affects newcomers of the same race.
I estimate the effect, at a show level, as the percentage change in newcomers of a race
r in response to the percentage change in rehired models of race r:
Newr,b,t
Allb,t
= βr
Rehirer,b,t
Allb,t
+
∑
i 6=r
βi
Rehirei,b,t
Allb,t
+ τt + γc + αb + εb,
where Newr,b,t is the count of all new models of race r walking for brand b in season t,
Allb,t is the count of all models walking for brand b in season t, Rehirer,b,t is the count of
all rehired models of race r walking for brand b in season t, τt is season fixed effect, γc is
city fixed effect, αb is the brand fixed effect, and εb is an error term clustered by brand.
1.4.2 Main Results
Table 1.6 reports the main results. The coefficients estimate the change in the number
of newcomers, by race, in response to retaining an additional model from previous seasons.
The retained models are counted separately for each race. I scale all the explanatory
variables by the mean of the dependent variable to interpret coefficients as percentage
changes and allow for comparison of estimates between regressions. The number of Asian,
Black, and Hispanic newcomers decreases with an additional retained model of their own
race and an additional White model. White models constitute the majority of all hires,
with retained models taking 38% of all spots and the newly hired models accounting for
another 49%. If a designer replaces one model in a show at random, this model is most
likely White.
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Because the number of spots in a show is limited, a substitution effect inevitably
occurs between all models. The main result is that the size of the substitution effect varies
across races. The baseline substitution rate (i.e., the change in the number of newcomers,
regardless of race, in response to an additional rehire of any race) is estimated in Column
1 of Table 1.6 and equals 7%. Once I keep the total number of models in a show fixed, by
adding a denominator to both sides of the equation, one rehired model takes the place of
one newcomer. An average number of newcomers per show is 14.3, which translates to a
7% decrease in newcomers in response to an additional rehired model.
The estimates in the last column of Table 1.6 are very close to the baseline substitution
rate in Column 1. The effect of an additional rehired model on the number of White
newcomers is close to 7%, regardless of race; the effect is 7.1%, 7.6%, and 7.2% for an
additional rehired Black, Hispanic, and White model, respectively. The effect is larger
for non-White rehired models classified as Other, 9.2%, and smaller for rehired Asian
models, 5.8%.
The estimate in Column 2 of Table 1.6 shows that an additional rehired Asian model
reduces the number of newly hired Asian models by 33.5%. An additional rehired White
model reduces the number of newly hired Asian models by 5.8%. The effect of a rehired
White model on Asian newcomers is almost six times smaller than that of a rehired Asian
model. The rehired models who are Black, Hispanic, or classified as Other, have no effect
on Asian newcomers.
The estimates for Black and Hispanic newcomers exhibit a similar pattern. An addi-
tional rehired Black model reduces the number of newly hired Black models by 13.7%.
The same estimate for Hispanic models is 29%. Both magnitudes are larger than the size
of the effect of an additional rehired White model. This effect is 5.2% for Black new-
comers and 6.7% for Hispanic newcomers. Asian and Hispanic rehires as well as rehires
classified as Other have no effect on Black newcomers. Black, Asian, and non-White
newcomers classified as Other have no effect on Hispanic newcomers.
Only 16 models are classified as Other in the data. The pattern for them is different.
While I still observe a strong substitution effect with the rehired models of their own
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race, 204%, there is also a complementarity between the newcomers classified as Other
and rehired Black models. This pattern may be due to designer preferences for the
minority models not accounted for in the brand fixed effect.
In Table 1.7, I test the difference across coefficients from the regressions in Table
1.6. The first column in Table 1.7 lists the p-values from the tests of difference between
the coefficient on Rehired Asian and coefficients on the estimates for rehired models of
other races from Column 2 (“Asian”) in Table 1.6. The coefficient estimate on Rehired
Asian in Column 2 of Table 1.6 is statistically smaller than coefficients on Rehired Black,
Rehired Hispanic, Rehired Other, and Rehired White, suggesting that the substitution
effect from an additional rehired Asian model on the number of Asian newcomers is
larger than the substitution effect from rehired models of any other race. Similarly, the
coefficient estimate on Rehired Black from Column 3 in Table 1.6 is statistically smaller
than the coefficient estimates on Rehired Asian, Rehired Hispanic, and Rehired White,
but not smaller than the coefficient on the Rehired Other. The coefficient estimates from
Columns 5 and 6 in Table 1.6 (“Hispanic” and “White”) are not statistically different
from other coefficient estimates in the respective regressions, suggesting that the effect
of Rehired Hispanic and Rehired White on Hispanic and White newcomers respectively
are not statistically different from the effect of the rehired models of other races. One
exception is the effect of Asian rehired models on White newcomers, which is statistically
smaller than the effect of rehired models of all other races on White newcomers.
Table 1.8 presents the results of the baseline regression split by city. For Asian new-
comers, the substitution effect from Asian rehired models is strongest in Milan (45.3%),
followed by New York (40.5%) and Paris (27.6%). For Black newcomers, the substitution
effect (21.2%) from Black rehired models is only present in New York shows. Milan and
Paris samples do not display a statistically significant effect of Black rehired models on
Black newcomers. The London Fashion Week has the largest average number of Asian
and Black models per show but the effect of Asian and Black rehired models on Asian
and Black newcomers is not estimated precisely.
The regression estimates of the effect of White rehired models on Asian and Black
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newcomers are similar across cities and close to a baseline substitution effect of 7% in
their magnitude. The effect of White rehired models on Asian newcomers is between
5.2% and 7.5%. The effect of Black rehires on Black newcomers is 3.7-6%.
Table 1.9 presents the results of the baseline regressions split by designer prefer-
ences in hiring Asian models (odd-numbered columns) and Black models (even-numbered
columns). The substitution effect is significant across six of eight split sample regressions.
For Black models, the substitution effect is the strongest for the designers who generally
hire the fewest Black models (first quartile) - 44.8%. The effect is decreasing for the
designers in the second (24%) and third quartile (22.4%). There is no effect for designers
in the fourth quartile. If we look at the average number of Black models per show, the
substitution effect disappears for designers who, on average, hire 2 or 3 Black models per
show. For Asian models, the magnitude of substitution effect is similar across all quartiles
(25.3%-34.5%). The coefficient is not significant for the first quartile of designers - those
hiring, on average, none or one Asian model per show. The lack of statistical significance
of this coefficient may be caused by a large number of designers who do not hire any
Asian models for their shows in this quartile.
1.4.3 Race-Blind Hiring
I simulate race-blind hiring in the same context to compare the main result to the
substitution effect under race-blind hiring. I collected data on the model listings from
the London, Milan, New York, and Paris offices of the top four modeling agencies. Na,c,r
is the number of models of race r listed on the website of a top modeling agency a in
their office in city c. A pool Pc,r of models of race r in city c is approximated by
Nc,r
ψc
,26
where ψc is the percentage of top agency models in the runway data. Each city has Dc
designers who show their collections for 35 seasons. In the first season, t = 1, a designer
d chooses Mc,d,1 models to walk in the runway from the distribution Mc. Each designer
chooses models randomly from the pool, Pc,
27 of aspiring models in a city c without
observing their race. In the first season, the probability of a selection, φc,1,n, by designer
26Nc,r = ΣaNa,c,r
27Pc = ΣrPc,r
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d is the same for all models in a city c and equals 1/Pc. In subsequent periods, the hiring
probability, φc,t,o, is increased by the rehiring rate δd for the models hired by designer d
previously. The hiring rate for the models who have never been hired by the designer
before, φc,t,n, is adjusted to make the hiring probabilities of all models sum up to one
for every designer in every period. Every period rehired models exit and enter a pool of
aspiring models in a city c at a rate ζc.
28 Na,c,r comes from top agency listings data. ψc
comes from model agency data on Vogue.com and the FMD. Dc, Mc, δd, ζc come from
the main data on model-show pairs from Vogue.com and Models.com.
I construct one hundred random samples under the condition of race-blind hiring
and run baseline specification. I sort the coefficient estimates and plot them in Figure
1.7 against the main result from Table 1.6. The coefficient estimates in Table 1.6 are
inconsistent with race-blind hiring. The most striking result is on the graph in the upper
left corner of Figure 1.7. It shows a large gap in the substitution effect between Asian
newcomers and Asian rehires estimated in the main data, -33.5%, and the estimates of the
same effect from the race-blind simulation. The smallest coefficient from the simulation
does not reach the dotted line suggesting that the data reject the hypothesis that the
substitution effect between Asian newcomers and Asian rehires arises from race-blind
hiring. The substitution effect between Black newcomers and Black rehires is shown on
the graph in the center. Only one draw out of one hundred has an estimate below -13.7%,
a substitution effect from the data. Most of the other coefficient estimates also do not
fall in line with the race-blind hiring. The substitution effects between Asian newcomers
and Black rehires, Black newcomers and Asian rehires, and Black newcomers and White
rehires are smaller than expected under race-blind hiring. The effect of White rehires on
Asian and White newcomers are consistent with race-blind hiring.
The averages of coefficients plotted in Figure 1.7 are in Table 1.10. The substitution
effect between Asian newcomers and Asian rehires is 11.4%, compared to the main result
of 33.5%. The same effect for Black models is 10%, compared to the main result of 13.7%.
28 The entry-exit rate of newcomers is irrelevant in this setting because there is no observable difference
between a model who entered the market this year and was not hired by any designer and a model who
entered the market the previous year but also was not hired by any designer.
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In addition, I observe a substitution effect of 6.7-6.8% between Asian newcomers and
Black incumbents and Asian incumbents and Black newcomers. There is no statistically
significant substitution effect among these groups of models in the baseline specification.
All the substitution effects with White models, incumbents and newcomers, are similar
to the baseline results and range between 6.5% and 6.8%.
Under the condition of race-blind hiring, simulated data generate on average 0.66
Asian newcomers per show (a decrease of 19%), 1.34 Black newcomers per show (an
increase of 35%), and 12.77 White newcomers per show (an increase of 4%). If the pool
of aspiring models from the top four agencies is representative of the race composition
of all aspiring models, these numbers suggest an oversupply of Black newcomers and an
undersupply of Asian newcomers.
1.4.4 Newcomers’ Portfolio Comparison
The main results indicate that minority newcomers are less likely to be hired if de-
signers retain many models of the same race from previous seasons. However, some
newcomers do get hired, even if a show features many rehired models of the same race.
Are these models different? I estimate whether portfolio characteristics of newcomers
change in response to the percentage increase in the rehired models of the same race in
a show. The general form of these regressions is:
Pi,t,r = αr + βr
Rehirer,b,t
Allb,t
+ εb,t,
where Pi,t is the number of editorials, advertising campaigns, or other items in model i’s
portfolio in season t, and εb,t is an error term clustered by show (brand-season).
Table 1.11 shows that the quality of portfolios of Asian newcomers improves as the
percentage of Asian rehires in a show increases. Asian newcomers in the shows with higher
percentage of Asian rehires have more editorials and advertising campaigns in the last
six months; and have more lookbooks, editorials, and advertisements over the length of
their careers than Asian newcomers in the shows with a lower percentage of rehired Asian
models. Other coefficient estimates are positive but not statistically significant, except
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for the number of catalogs in the past six months, which is negative but not statistically
significant. Altogether, these results suggest that Asian newcomers in the shows with a
higher percentage of Asian rehires have better portfolios than Asian newcomers in shows
with a lower percentage of Asian rehires.
The results are similar for Black newcomers. Table 1.12 shows that Black newcom-
ers in the shows with a higher percentage of Black rehires have more editorials and
lookbooks in the last six months; and have more lookbooks, editorials, catalogues, and
advertisements over the length of their careers than Black newcomers in shows with a
lower percentage of rehired Black models. Other coefficient estimates are positive but
not statistically significant. Similarly to Asian models, Black newcomers in the shows
with a higher percentage of rehires of the same race have better portfolios than Black
newcomers in shows with a lower percentage of rehires of the same race.
Table 1.13 shows the estimates for White newcomers, and the results are mixed. White
newcomers in the shows with a higher percentage of retained White models have more
covers and advertisements in the past six months and career-wise, but also have fewer
lookbooks and editorials in the last six months and career-wise, and fewer catalogs over
the course of their career. The results for White newcomers suggest that there is no clear
relationship between the quality of a portfolio and the percentage of rehired models of
the same race.
1.5 Conclusion
Many industries face public pressure to reduce race and gender gaps in hiring. Because
the hiring process is hard to monitor, attention is shifted to its outcomes, which are easily
observed. It is common to judge the fairness in hiring by the racial composition of an
existing workforce. In this paper, I argue that the focus on counting minority hires creates
incentives for quota-based hiring, even if legal enforcement or guidelines are absent.
I use data on high-end runway hiring to examine whether employers use quotas to
achieve a desired racial composition of their workforce. This unique setting, which is
not constrained by long-term contracts, teamwork, firing costs, worker interaction, or
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networks, but is very visible and under constant public scrutiny, demonstrates how quotas
emerge in a competitive labor market. The results show that designers revert to a fixed
number of minority hires per show. If they retain more minority models from previous
shows, newcomers of the same race are either not hired at all or have stronger credentials
than if they are hired for a show with fewer or no rehires of their race.
Rather than undermining the notion that the fashion industry needs a more diverse
workforce, this study highlights that current diversity efforts are misguided. Current
hiring practices force minority models into niche labor markets, in which they compete
in minor leagues of their own. One may think that smaller markets are not necessarily
more competitive. The results of simulation suggest that there is an undersupply of Asian
models and an oversupply of Black models, making the niche market for Asian models
less competitive and niche market for Black models more competitive in comparison to
the larger market for White models.
More diversity on the runway achieved by reserving “minority” spots increases the
labor supply among young minority women because they see an opportunity to “make
it” in a market that was previously sealed off to them. However, they do not necessarily
compete in the same market as White models. The quotas lock them into a smaller,
niche market, where they compete among themselves for the few “minority” spots on a
runway, because they are less “comparable” to the White models.
More uncertain demand faced by minority workers is another implication of quota-
based hiring. Because a worker does not know whether the quota has been filled or not,
she spends effort on getting a job with an employer who does not consider hiring her.
The findings herein can be extended to the entertainment industry (music, television,
film) and advertising, as appearance plays a role in hiring decisions in those industries as
well. In addition, the implications of the results in this paper are especially important in
occupations which face public scrutiny about minority representation. The results serve
as a caution to many industries that face criticism about diversity, including the tech
industry and science. If employers practice race-based or gender-based hiring to fend off
criticism about the lack of diversity in the workforce, they are negating the main principle
24
that underlies the calls for diversity – an unbiased and fair hiring process.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 1.1: A Composition Card
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Figure 1.3: Data Structure
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Figure 1.5: Models walk in the Carolina Herreira Spring 2017 Runway Show
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Figure 1.7: Simulation Results
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Notes: This figure shows that hiring patterns in the data are inconsistent with race-blind hiring. The gray dots are estimated from the
baseline regressions on the simulated data and sorted by size. They are plotted against the regression coefficients from the main regression
in Table 1.6 shown as a dotted line. The outcome variable is newcomers of a given race, as a percentage of all hires. The new hires are
defined as models who have never walked a runway for the brand before. The explanatory variables are the rehired models of different races
and ethnicities, as a percentage of all hires in a show. They are scaled by the mean of dependent variable. The rehired models have walked
in a runway for the brand before. Asian models include East Asians, South-East Asians, and South Asians.
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Table 1.1: Show-level City Statistics
Count Percent
London 517 0.12
Milan 886 0.20
New York 1581 0.37
Paris 1345 0.31
Observations 4329
Notes: This table shows the summary statistics on the show location in the main data. The unit of analysis is a show.
Table 1.2: Model-level Race Statistics
Count Percent
Asian 185 0.06
Black 236 0.08
Hispanic 53 0.02
Other 16 0.01
White 2544 0.84
Observations 3034
Notes: This table shows the summary statistics on the race of models in the main data. The unit of analysis is a model. Asian models
include East Asians, South-East Asians, and South Asians. White Hispanics are included in the White group. Black Hispanics are included
in the Black group. Non-White and non-Black Hispanics are a separate group, Hispanic. Other includes visually non-White models (e.g.,
Middle Eastern, Native American, Pacific Islander) who are not classified elsewhere.
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Table 1.5: Show-level Race Statistics
mean sd min max
All hires, count
Asian 1.49 1.47 0 11
Black 1.66 1.91 0 23
Hispanic 0.37 0.67 0 6
Other 0.09 0.30 0 3
White 22.71 9.04 0 80
All hires, percentage points
Asian 0.06 0.05 0.00 0.36
Black 0.06 0.07 0.00 0.95
Hispanic 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.26
Other 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.15
White 0.86 0.10 0.00 1.00
New hires, count
Asian 0.82 0.99 0 7
Black 0.99 1.32 0 17
Hispanic 0.21 0.49 0 4
Other 0.06 0.25 0 2
White 12.24 5.31 0 49
New hires, percentage points
Asian 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.36
Black 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.89
Hispanic 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.21
Other 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.15
White 0.49 0.18 0.00 1.00
Rehired, count
Asian 0.67 0.99 0 8
Black 0.67 1.05 0 10
Hispanic 0.16 0.43 0 5
Other 0.03 0.17 0 2
White 10.47 7.42 0 56
Rehired, percentage points
Asian 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.21
Black 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.30
Hispanic 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.22
Other 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.10
White 0.38 0.19 0.00 0.93
Observations 4329
Notes: This table presents race statistics for the full sample and separately for newly hired and rehired models. The unit of analysis is
a fashion show. The sample includes all major runway shows from the Big Four (New York, Milan, Paris, and London) Fashion Weeks, held
twice a year, from 2000 to 2017. The new hires are the models who have never walked a runway for the brand before. The rehired models have
walked in a runway for the brand before. The sample is split by race and ethnicity. Asian models include East Asians, South-East Asians,
and South Asians. White Hispanics are included as White. Black Hispanics are included as Black. Non-White and non-Black Hispanics are
a separate group, Hispanic. Other includes visually non-White models (e.g., Middle Eastern, Native American, Pacific Islander) who are not
classified elsewhere.
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Table 1.6: Brand-level regressions
New hires All Races Asian Black Hispanic Other White
Rehired All Races -0.0698∗∗∗
(2.14e-10)
Rehired Asian -0.335∗∗∗ 0.00132 -0.0581 -0.0500 -0.0582∗∗∗
(0.0388) (0.0275) (0.0606) (0.101) (0.00342)
Rehired Black -0.00783 -0.137∗∗∗ -0.0395 0.287∗∗ -0.0709∗∗∗
(0.0248) (0.0407) (0.0539) (0.124) (0.00404)
Rehired Hispanic -0.0320 0.00179 -0.290∗ 0.266 -0.0760∗∗∗
(0.0466) (0.0449) (0.158) (0.167) (0.00545)
Rehired Other 0.185 0.0715 0.157 -2.043∗∗∗ -0.0923∗∗∗
(0.154) (0.135) (0.195) (0.569) (0.0160)
Rehired White -0.0580∗∗∗ -0.0521∗∗∗ -0.0670∗∗∗ -0.0891∗∗∗ -0.0720∗∗∗
(0.00533) (0.00613) (0.0133) (0.0199) (0.000711)
City FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Season FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Brand FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4329 4329 4329 4329 4329 4329
R-sq 1.00 0.40 0.41 0.26 0.24 0.91
Notes: This table shows the relationship between the number of rehired models and the number of new hires, by race. For example, the
first coefficient in the second column estimates the change in Asian newcomers in response to the rehiring of an additional Asian model. The
unit of observation is a fashion show. The sample includes all major runway shows from the Big Four (New York, Milan, Paris, and London)
Fashion Weeks, held twice a year, from 2000 to 2017.
The outcome variable is newcomers of a given race, as a percentage of all hires. The new hires are defined as models who have never
walked a runway for the brand before. The explanatory variables are the rehired models of different races and ethnicities, as a percentage of
all hires in a show. They are scaled by the mean of the dependent variable. The rehired models have walked in a runway for the brand before.
Asian models include East Asians, South-East Asians, and South Asians. White Hispanics are included in the White group. Black Hispanics
are included in the Black group. Non-White and non-Black Hispanics are a separate group, Hispanic. Other includes visually non-White
models (e.g., Middle Eastern, Native American, Pacific Islander) who are not classified elsewhere.
All regressions include city, season, and brand fixed effects. For example, Chanel Spring/Summer 2001 runway show in Paris switches
on indicators for the city of Paris, the season of Spring/Summer 2001, and the Chanel brand.
All regressions are estimated using OLS. Standard errors, clustered on brand, are reported in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01.
Table 1.7: Comparison of coefficients tests (p-values)
New hires (% of all hires) Asian Black Hispanic Other White
βa = βb = βh = βo = βw =
βa 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00
βb 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.79
βh 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.46
βo 0.00 0.16 0.07 0.21
βw 0.00 0.05 0.15 0.00
Notes: This table shows the p-values from the tests that compare coefficients from the regressions in Columns 2-6 in Table 1.6. The
comparison is within regression. The empty cell indicates the coefficient of interest, which all other coefficients in regression are compared
to. For example, the p-value in the second row of the first column (“Asian”) tests the difference between coefficients on Rehired Asian and
Rehired Black from Column 2 (“Asian”) in Table 1.6.
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Table 1.10: Race-blind simulation regressions
New hires (% of all hires) Asian Black White
Rehired Asian (% of all hires) -0.1298 -0.0728 -0.0695
Rehired Black (% of all hires) -0.0701 -0.1069 -0.0689
Rehired White (% of all hires) -0.0698 -0.0712 -0.0727
City FE Yes Yes Yes
Season FE Yes Yes Yes
Brand FE Yes Yes Yes
New hires, average count (by race at the top) 0.6148 1.2612 11.9266
Observations per draw 4352 4352 4352
Notes: This table shows the relationship between the number of rehired models and the number of new hires, by race. The coefficients in
the table are the averages of the coefficients from the baseline regressions on a hundred random samples constructed under the assumption of
race-blind hiring. The first coefficient in the first column estimates the change in Asian newcomers in response to the rehiring of an additional
Asian model. The unit of observation is a fashion show. The outcome variable is newcomers of a given race, as the percentage of all hires. The
new hires are defined as models who have never walked a runway for the brand before. The explanatory variables are the rehired models of
different races and ethnicities, as the percentage of all hires in a show. They are scaled by the mean of the dependent variable. All regressions
include city, season, and brand fixed effects and are estimated using OLS.
39
T
a
b
le
1
.1
1
:
N
e
w
c
o
m
e
rs
’
p
o
rt
fo
li
o
c
o
m
p
a
ri
so
n
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
N
e
w
A
si
a
n
H
ir
e
s
L
o
o
k
b
o
o
k
s,
se
a
so
n
E
d
it
o
ri
a
ls
,
se
a
so
n
C
o
v
e
rs
,
se
a
so
n
C
a
ta
lo
g
s,
se
a
so
n
A
d
s,
se
a
so
n
L
o
o
k
b
o
o
k
s,
c
a
re
e
r
E
d
it
o
ri
a
ls
,
c
a
re
e
r
C
o
v
e
rs
,
c
a
re
e
r
C
a
ta
lo
g
s,
c
a
re
e
r
A
d
s,
c
a
re
e
r
R
e
h
ir
e
d
A
si
a
n
0
.2
0
4
9
.0
9
9
∗∗
∗
0
.6
2
7
-0
.0
3
6
9
1
.5
7
0
∗∗
∗
1
.4
7
5
∗∗
2
4
.5
1
∗∗
∗
3
.0
1
6
0
.0
3
2
9
6
.3
1
5
∗∗
∗
(0
.2
1
8
)
(2
.3
8
8
)
(0
.5
9
1
)
(0
.0
5
7
2
)
(0
.5
9
4
)
(0
.5
7
6
)
(8
.2
9
9
)
(1
.8
3
3
)
(0
.1
9
0
)
(1
.5
1
9
)
M
e
a
n
D
V
0
.1
0
2
.3
2
0
.6
2
0
.0
2
0
.5
1
0
.3
7
7
.1
9
1
.8
7
0
.0
9
1
.7
0
O
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
2
7
8
9
2
7
8
9
2
7
8
9
2
7
8
9
2
7
8
9
2
7
8
9
2
7
8
9
2
7
8
9
2
7
8
9
2
7
8
9
R
-s
q
0
.0
0
0
.0
1
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
0
.0
1
N
o
te
s.
T
h
e
ta
b
le
sh
o
w
s
th
e
re
la
ti
o
n
sh
ip
b
e
tw
e
e
n
th
e
p
o
rt
fo
li
o
q
u
a
li
ty
o
f
A
si
a
n
n
e
w
c
o
m
e
rs
a
n
d
th
e
p
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
o
f
A
si
a
n
re
h
ir
e
s
in
a
sh
o
w
.
T
h
e
u
n
it
o
f
o
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
is
m
o
d
e
l-
sh
o
w
p
a
ir
.
T
h
e
sa
m
p
le
c
o
n
si
st
s
o
f
a
ll
m
o
d
e
l-
sh
o
w
p
a
ir
s
w
h
e
re
m
o
d
e
l
is
a
n
A
si
a
n
n
e
w
c
o
m
e
r.
T
h
e
sh
o
w
s
w
it
h
o
u
t
A
si
a
n
n
e
w
c
o
m
e
rs
a
re
e
x
c
lu
d
e
d
fr
o
m
th
e
sa
m
p
le
.
T
h
e
o
u
tc
o
m
e
v
a
ri
a
b
le
is
th
e
n
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
e
d
it
o
ri
a
ls
,
a
d
v
e
rt
is
in
g
c
a
m
p
a
ig
n
s
o
r
o
th
e
r
p
o
rt
fo
li
o
it
e
m
s
o
f
n
e
w
h
ir
e
s
w
h
o
a
re
A
si
a
n
.
T
h
e
n
e
w
h
ir
e
s
a
re
d
e
fi
n
e
d
a
s
m
o
d
e
ls
w
h
o
h
a
v
e
n
e
v
e
r
w
a
lk
e
d
a
ru
n
w
a
y
fo
r
th
e
b
ra
n
d
b
e
fo
re
.
T
h
e
e
x
p
la
n
a
to
ry
v
a
ri
a
b
le
is
th
e
re
h
ir
e
d
m
o
d
e
ls
w
h
o
a
re
A
si
a
n
,
a
s
th
e
p
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
o
f
a
ll
h
ir
e
s
in
a
sh
o
w
.
A
ll
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
a
re
e
st
im
a
te
d
u
si
n
g
O
L
S
.
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
e
rr
o
rs
,
c
lu
st
e
re
d
o
n
sh
o
w
,
a
re
re
p
o
rt
e
d
in
p
a
re
n
th
e
se
s.
*
p
<
0
.1
,
*
*
p
<
0
.0
5
,
*
*
*
p
<
0
.0
1
.
T
a
b
le
1
.1
2
:
N
e
w
c
o
m
e
rs
’
p
o
rt
fo
li
o
c
o
m
p
a
ri
so
n
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
N
e
w
B
la
c
k
H
ir
e
s
L
o
o
k
b
o
o
k
s,
se
a
so
n
E
d
it
o
ri
a
ls
,
se
a
so
n
C
o
v
e
rs
,
se
a
so
n
C
a
ta
lo
g
s,
se
a
so
n
A
d
s,
se
a
so
n
L
o
o
k
b
o
o
k
s,
c
a
re
e
r
E
d
it
o
ri
a
ls
,
c
a
re
e
r
C
o
v
e
rs
,
c
a
re
e
r
C
a
ta
lo
g
s,
c
a
re
e
r
A
d
s,
c
a
re
e
r
R
e
h
ir
e
d
B
la
c
k
0
.6
5
7
∗∗
∗
5
.1
6
9
∗∗
∗
0
.2
1
2
0
.0
2
0
6
0
.7
2
1
1
.3
1
6
∗∗
∗
1
6
.8
7
∗∗
∗
2
.8
8
8
0
.4
6
3
∗∗
4
.6
8
6
∗∗
∗
(0
.2
1
5
)
(1
.4
4
1
)
(0
.2
4
3
)
(0
.0
7
6
5
)
(0
.5
1
0
)
(0
.3
8
2
)
(3
.6
0
8
)
(1
.8
8
3
)
(0
.2
1
9
)
(1
.2
9
4
)
M
e
a
n
D
V
0
.0
8
1
.4
2
0
.3
0
0
.0
5
0
.5
1
0
.2
0
3
.0
9
1
.0
1
0
.1
5
1
.3
0
O
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
3
7
0
0
3
7
0
0
3
7
0
0
3
7
0
0
3
7
0
0
3
7
0
0
3
7
0
0
3
7
0
0
3
7
0
0
3
7
0
0
R
-s
q
0
.0
1
0
.0
1
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
0
.0
1
0
.0
1
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
0
.0
1
N
o
te
s.
T
h
e
ta
b
le
sh
o
w
s
th
e
re
la
ti
o
n
sh
ip
b
e
tw
e
e
n
th
e
p
o
rt
fo
li
o
q
u
a
li
ty
o
f
B
la
c
k
n
e
w
c
o
m
e
rs
a
n
d
th
e
p
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
o
f
B
la
c
k
re
h
ir
e
s
in
a
sh
o
w
.
T
h
e
u
n
it
o
f
o
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
is
m
o
d
e
l-
sh
o
w
p
a
ir
.
T
h
e
sa
m
p
le
c
o
n
si
st
s
o
f
a
ll
m
o
d
e
l-
sh
o
w
p
a
ir
s
w
h
e
re
m
o
d
e
l
is
a
B
la
c
k
n
e
w
c
o
m
e
r.
T
h
e
sh
o
w
s
w
it
h
o
u
t
B
la
c
k
n
e
w
c
o
m
e
rs
a
re
e
x
c
lu
d
e
d
fr
o
m
th
e
sa
m
p
le
.
T
h
e
o
u
tc
o
m
e
v
a
ri
a
b
le
is
th
e
n
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
e
d
it
o
ri
a
ls
,
a
d
v
e
rt
is
in
g
c
a
m
p
a
ig
n
s
o
r
o
th
e
r
p
o
rt
fo
li
o
it
e
m
s
o
f
n
e
w
h
ir
e
s
w
h
o
a
re
B
la
c
k
.
T
h
e
n
e
w
h
ir
e
s
a
re
d
e
fi
n
e
d
a
s
m
o
d
e
ls
w
h
o
h
a
v
e
n
e
v
e
r
w
a
lk
e
d
a
ru
n
w
a
y
fo
r
th
e
b
ra
n
d
b
e
fo
re
.
T
h
e
e
x
p
la
n
a
to
ry
v
a
ri
a
b
le
is
th
e
re
h
ir
e
d
m
o
d
e
ls
w
h
o
a
re
B
la
c
k
,
a
s
th
e
p
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
o
f
a
ll
h
ir
e
s
in
a
sh
o
w
.
A
ll
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
a
re
e
st
im
a
te
d
u
si
n
g
O
L
S
.
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
e
rr
o
rs
,
c
lu
st
e
re
d
o
n
sh
o
w
,
a
re
re
p
o
rt
e
d
in
p
a
re
n
th
e
se
s.
*
p
<
0
.1
,
*
*
p
<
0
.0
5
,
*
*
*
p
<
0
.0
1
.
T
a
b
le
1
.1
3
:
N
e
w
c
o
m
e
rs
’
p
o
rt
fo
li
o
c
o
m
p
a
ri
so
n
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
N
e
w
W
h
it
e
H
ir
e
s
L
o
o
k
b
o
o
k
s,
se
a
so
n
E
d
it
o
ri
a
ls
,
se
a
so
n
C
o
v
e
rs
,
se
a
so
n
C
a
ta
lo
g
s,
se
a
so
n
A
d
s,
se
a
so
n
L
o
o
k
b
o
o
k
s,
c
a
re
e
r
E
d
it
o
ri
a
ls
,
c
a
re
e
r
C
o
v
e
rs
,
c
a
re
e
r
C
a
ta
lo
g
s,
c
a
re
e
r
A
d
s,
c
a
re
e
r
R
e
h
ir
e
d
W
h
it
e
-0
.0
2
5
3
∗∗
-0
.6
1
4
∗∗
∗
0
.2
5
4
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
0
1
5
2
0
.3
5
4
∗∗
∗
-0
.1
8
9
∗∗
∗
-2
.4
1
4
∗∗
∗
0
.6
8
1
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
3
8
5
∗
0
.3
7
4
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
1
0
1
)
(0
.1
1
0
)
(0
.0
2
9
1
)
(0
.0
0
4
8
7
)
(0
.0
4
2
3
)
(0
.0
3
5
9
)
(0
.3
1
1
)
(0
.1
5
2
)
(0
.0
2
1
4
)
(0
.1
1
8
)
M
e
a
n
D
V
0
.0
7
1
.1
6
0
.3
7
0
.0
2
0
.4
2
0
.2
2
3
.0
0
1
.3
1
0
.0
9
1
.2
2
O
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
4
8
3
0
4
4
8
3
0
4
4
8
3
0
4
4
8
3
0
4
4
8
3
0
4
4
8
3
0
4
4
8
3
0
4
4
8
3
0
4
4
8
3
0
4
4
8
3
0
4
R
-s
q
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
0
.0
0
N
o
te
s.
T
h
e
ta
b
le
sh
o
w
s
th
e
re
la
ti
o
n
sh
ip
b
e
tw
e
e
n
p
o
rt
fo
li
o
q
u
a
li
ty
o
f
W
h
it
e
n
e
w
c
o
m
e
rs
a
n
d
th
e
p
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
o
f
W
h
it
e
re
h
ir
e
s
in
a
sh
o
w
.
T
h
e
u
n
it
o
f
o
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
is
m
o
d
e
l-
sh
o
w
p
a
ir
.
T
h
e
sa
m
p
le
c
o
n
si
st
s
o
f
a
ll
m
o
d
e
l-
sh
o
w
p
a
ir
s
w
h
e
re
m
o
d
e
l
is
a
W
h
it
e
n
e
w
c
o
m
e
r.
T
h
e
sh
o
w
s
w
it
h
o
u
t
W
h
it
e
n
e
w
c
o
m
e
rs
a
re
e
x
c
lu
d
e
d
fr
o
m
th
e
sa
m
p
le
.
T
h
e
o
u
tc
o
m
e
v
a
ri
a
b
le
is
th
e
n
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
e
d
it
o
ri
a
ls
,
a
d
v
e
rt
is
in
g
c
a
m
p
a
ig
n
s
o
r
o
th
e
r
p
o
rt
fo
li
o
it
e
m
s
o
f
n
e
w
h
ir
e
s
w
h
o
a
re
W
h
it
e
.
T
h
e
n
e
w
h
ir
e
s
a
re
d
e
fi
n
e
d
a
s
m
o
d
e
ls
w
h
o
h
a
v
e
n
e
v
e
r
w
a
lk
e
d
a
ru
n
w
a
y
fo
r
th
e
b
ra
n
d
b
e
fo
re
.
T
h
e
e
x
p
la
n
a
to
ry
v
a
ri
a
b
le
is
th
e
re
h
ir
e
d
m
o
d
e
ls
w
h
o
a
re
W
h
it
e
,
a
s
th
e
p
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
o
f
a
ll
h
ir
e
s
in
a
sh
o
w
.
A
ll
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
a
re
e
st
im
a
te
d
u
si
n
g
O
L
S
.
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
e
rr
o
rs
,
c
lu
st
e
re
d
o
n
sh
o
w
,
a
re
re
p
o
rt
e
d
in
p
a
re
n
th
e
se
s.
*
p
<
0
.1
,
*
*
p
<
0
.0
5
,
*
*
*
p
<
0
.0
1
.
40
CHAPTER II
Local Fiscal Multiplier on R&D and Science
Spending: Evidence from the American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act
2.1 Introduction
What is the effect of federal R&D and science29 spending on local employment? This
paper analyzes the 2009 ARRA stimulus spending on R&D and science to estimate the
effect of fiscal spending on employment [Keynes, 1936] and the effect of R&D and science
on economic growth [Schumpeter, 1942]. We provide new insights to these old questions
by finding large employment effect of R&D and science spending.
Science is generally perceived as a long-term endeavor, a foundation for applied re-
search, valuable to the nation in the long run but hardly relevant for a short-term eco-
nomic development. The main contribution of R&D and science to the economy lies
in the areas of innovation, technological growth, and entrepreneurship. Investments in
science take time to come to fruition and the outcomes take on various forms of codified
knowledge (scientific publications, patents, algorithms, methods), new products and ser-
vices services, as well as highly trained individuals. In addition to the long-term scientific
contributions to the economy, R&D and science also affect short-term economic develop-
ment through job creation. This paper focuses on this short-term effect, and approaches
the scientific process as daily productive work, not too different from routine office work
[Weinberg et al., 2014].
29 Hereafter “R&D and science” and “research” are used interchangeably.
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The existing economic literature does not provide a jobs multiplier specific to R&D
and science spending. If the earnings and consumption of researchers are similar to those
of workers in other industries, why would the jobs multiplier be different? In a standard
Keynesian model, it does not matter where new income enters the economy. If we abstract
away from the long-term benefits of new knowledge, digging ditches and building rockets
should have similar short-term effects on job creation. If anything, there has been a
presumption that “brick and mortar” infrastructure spending has greater employment
effects, and that science is likely to give rise to creative destruction of jobs.30
Presuming that R&D spending exerts little or no short term stimulus effect can lead
to under-investment in these important activities. Recent evidence suggests that the
composition of government spending may matter for the size of the multiplier. Fed-
eral spending on non-durable goods, including services, has been found to generate a
larger GDP multiplier than spending on durable goods [Boehm, 2016]. Feyrer and Sac-
erdote [2011] find considerable variation in the size of the multiplier for different types of
spending, ranging from negative multipliers for education and public security to positive
multipliers on low-income support, transportation, and energy. Chodorow-Reich et al.
[2012] estimate the multiplier specifically for Medicaid outlays. Leduc and Wilson [2013]
examine the multiplier on highway spending. We contribute to this literature by pro-
viding an estimate of the multiplier on R&D and science spending. The capital-to-labor
ratio, earnings level, employee consumption patterns, complementarity with other sources
of funding, uncertainty, and flexible capacity (i.e., lower adjustment costs) in R&D and
science may all contribute to the differences between the multiplier on R&D and science
and an aggregate multiplier on all government spending.
We treat the measurement of a fiscal multiplier on R&D and science spending as an
empirical question. While discrepancies among multiplier estimates in the literature may
reflect differences in macroeconomic conditions, the form of the stimulus (e.g., tax cuts,
direct spending, or transfers), data sources, or the estimation approach, we investigate
the possibility that differences in the spending purpose directly affect the multiplier.
30 The larger multiplier on “brick and mortar” spending is also a reflection of presumptions about
differences in the average earnings and marginal propensity to consume of different employees.
42
We abstract away from the general equilibrium effects of fiscal stimulus and estimate
a local multiplier. Note that a local multiplier is a different indicator than the national
multiplier in a Keynesian model. The national multiplier represents the value (in dollars of
GDP or number of jobs) created after the government adds a dollar of stimulus to a closed
economy. The national multiplier is higher when interest rates are low [Woodford, 2011],
higher during recessions [Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2012], and lower for temporary
increases in government spending [Baxter and King, 1993]. The local multiplier measures
the change in the output or employment after adding a dollar of government spending to
a smaller open economy, such as state or county, relative to other open economies within
a fiscal union [Nakamura and Steinsson, 2014]. Unlike the national multiplier, the local
multiplier estimated here is not sensitive to macroeconomic changes, like changes in the
interest rate, that are common to all economies in a fiscal union. It is still affected by
labor underutilization during recessions, as that varies across counties.
The variation used to estimate local multipliers comes from county- or state-level
differences. Local fiscal multipliers, especially at the county level, may be estimated
more precisely than a national multiplier because of a larger sample size. They, however,
are sensitive to attenuation bias from measurement error in the location of spending.
This paper uses new, more carefully constructed measures of the location of ARRA
spending in order to reduce attenuation bias. Local multipliers are also sensitive to
spillover effects from cross-county or cross-state mobility: they are increased by labor
mobility if spending attracts in-migration to counties that receive more spending and
they are decreased by mobility in consumption if employees spend their additional income
in neighboring counties or states.
We examine changes in employment in response to federal spending on R&D and
science in the context of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA). The
ARRA was signed into law in February 2009. Its goal was to provide a large federal
stimulus to reduce the toll of recession on the American economy. The large size and the
speed of disbursement were two important aspects of ARRA. It generated a quantitatively
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significant, largely unanticipated shock to government spending.31 As we discuss further
below, R&D spending was particularly unanticipated, making it especially approapriate
for estimating causal effects.
While most ARRA spending targeted areas hit hard by the recession, the geographic
allocation of R&D and science spending was intended to be exogenous to economic con-
ditions. The allocation was based on a peer review process or the availability of resources
to carry out research projects. For example, when the stimulus bill was passed, National
Science Foundation (NSF) program officers funded deserving proposals they had not pre-
viously had the resources to fund. Approximately 80% of stimulus-backed awards went
to projects submitted prior to ARRA. The National Institutes of Health (NIH), on the
other hand, issued a call for new proposals to be funded under ARRA [Harmon, 2010].
Even there, the recipients had to be institutions that were prepared to submit a credible
NIH proposal under a very tight deadline, so the geographic allocation primarily reflected
local scientific capability.
Even though these grants were allocated based on scientific merit or capability, they
were not assigned randomly. This presents a challenge in measuring the effect of ARRA
research spending on local employment. The counties receiving ARRA research awards
may be different from other counties in ways that influence employment trends. In addi-
tion to controlling for factors affecting employment and modeling a change in employment
trend for each county, we employ a two-stage strategy to reduce endogeneity problems.
First, we estimate the probability of selection into receiving ARRA research funds and
construct an inverse Mills ratio term to capture it. A county’s research intensity is the
main predictor of selection into receiving ARRA research award and award’s size. We use
two dummy variables as excluded covariates of research intensity: whether a county has a
research university and whether there is at least one person employed in R&D and science
services in the county prior to the recession. We estimate a cross-county IV regression on
a subsample of counties with R&D and science awards to estimate the effect of ARRA
research awards on the change in employment. We use the inverse Mills ratio from the
31 Hourihan [2015] provides an overview of ARRA research spending in the context of total federal
spending on R&D and science.
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selection equation and two new instruments: the natural logarithm of doctoral degrees
issued in a county in 2010 and the number of individuals employed in R&D and science
per capita in 2007, in the cross-county IV regressions.
We find that during ARRA disbursement period, which lasted from 2009 to 2013,
27 jobs were added in response to one million USD in ARRA stimulus on R&D and
science. Traditionally, the multiplier is presented in a form of a job-year cost. Converting
our baseline result into job-year cost is not straightforward because the disbursement of
ARRA funds took place over five years, the average length of a project exceeded two
years, and the data on yearly payments are not available at the county-level. Taking all
these into account leads to an estimated $15,000 USD per job-year, one of the lowest
estimates in the recent literature on fiscal multipliers.
By providing an estimate of the fiscal multiplier on R&D and science spending, we
contribute to the economics literature in two ways. First, we contribute to the literature
on fiscal multipliers. We provide the first estimate of the multiplier on R&D and science
spending. We also contribute to the literature on the effect of R&D and science on
local economy. Hausman [2012] measures the effect of university innovation on long-
term economic growth of local economies. She finds that an additional $10 million of
the Department of Defense (DOD) funding or $7 million of NIH funding before 1980
generated an additional job per county-industry after 1980. Dinerstein et al. [2014] find
no evidence of employment growth in counties around universities in response to federal
research funds. We study federal spending on R&D and science in general, not just
spending on universities or in university counties, and focus on the short-term effects on
local employment during and after the Great Recession, and find much larger effects.
2.2 Empirical Model
Our goal is to evaluate the effect of ARRA R&D and science spending on the change
in local employment at the county level. We start with a simple model which estimates
the average number of jobs created in a US county over ARRA disbursement period in
response to a million USD in research spending. In our baseline specification, we use the
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change in employment from 2009 to 2013, a time period over which ARRA funds were
disbursed to recipients in full, to capture all the spending shocks that accrued due to
ARRA. The equation below captures this framework:
Empc,2013 − Empc,2009
1
5
Σ2013n=2009Popc,n
= αs + β
ARRA Resc
1
5
Σ2013n=2009Popc,n
+XcΓ + εc,
where Empc,t is employment in county c in year t, Popc,t is population in county c in
year t, ARRA Resc is total ARRA spending on research in county c in 2009-2013, Xc is
a vector of control variables, αs is a state-level shock, and εc is an error term.
This specification follows estimation strategies in earlier literature on cross-sectional
fiscal multipliers [Chodorow-Reich et al., 2012; Wilson, 2012]. The minor difference is
that we are estimating county-level multiplier. State-level multipliers are more common
in the earlier studies.
The counties which received research awards under ARRA are, on average, larger than
all other counties.32 To account for that, we scale the outcome variable and all ARRA
variables by the population averaged over disbursement period following the standard
practice in the literature. We scale employment-based control variables by the population
averaged over respective time periods.
We estimate the effect of ARRA research spending on employment at the county
level. Because US counties are open economies, we have to account for spillover effects
from different sources: worker spending outside a county, cross-county mobility for job
opportunities, and mis-measurement of money flows from primary contractors to sub-
contractors and vendors. There is an important difference between attenuation due to
open economy and due to mis-measurement or misreporting of the geography of spend-
ing. The spillovers from cross-county spending and labor mobility are inherent in the
level of analysis. We test whether factor mobility is driving the estimates, but it doesn’t
necessarily make the estimates wrong. The location of spending, on the other hand, is
a measurement issue, and we address that by providing a precise match between ARRA
32 Table 2.9 shows summary statistics for counties which received ARRA spending on R&D and Science
in comparison to all other counties.
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spending and geographic location of all recipients, including vendors and subcontractors.
The spillover effects of the worker spending in other counties and mis-measurement of
money flows cause the attenuation of estimates. The worker cross-county mobility leads
to the overestimation of the effect. We control for spillover effects in two ways: track
subcontractor and vendor transactions to their zipcodes33 and control for ARRA research
spending in adjacent counties. It is also possible that some counties received more ARRA
stimulus in general due to seniority and political weight of their representatives. We proxy
this “clout” with ARRA spending on all other issues.
We control for a number of factors which are correlated with the pace of economic
recovery. We include the change in employment from 2007 to 2009 because counties that
lost fewer jobs during recession might have less room to add new jobs during recovery.
The post-recession employment changes might differ between urban and rural counties
or depend on the fraction of manufacturing jobs in a county. For this reason, we add an
indicator for metropolitan county and per capita count of individuals employed in man-
ufacturing before recession. We also include state fixed effects to account for differences
in post-recession recovery across states. Even after controlling for different characteris-
tics of a county that are relevant to the changes in employment, we cannot exclude the
possibility of county-specific trends. To alleviate this issue, we use prior data to model
county-specific trends in employment changes over five-year periods on a rolling basis.
We then extrapolate out of sample to predict the change in employment from 2009 to
2013 for each county.
We rely on a number of ARRA features to reduce concerns about strategic hiring
and reallocation of funds. The stimulus was largely unanticipated by the final recipients.
This is especially true for research spending. It does not fall under the areas tradition-
ally subsidized during recessions and was not expected to be a part of ARRA until the
last moment. This situation is somewhat unique as anti-recessionary spending is often
anticipated.
33 While it is possible that some of the recipients are importers, we are not able to track ARRA funds
to foreign countries. We take export-import structure of a county as given and estimate the effect of
ARRA on the number of jobs created locally. We do not include foreign jobs created as a result of ARRA
into our multiplier.
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We address the possibility of substitution between ARRA research awards and other
sources of R&D and science funding. There is no evidence of substitution between on-
going federal spending on R&D and science and ARRA research awards. The federal
government gave out ARRA stimulus in addition to the federal R&D and science awards.
The latter were trending flat over the past decade. Figure 1 from Hourihan [2015], shows
ARRA R&D spending as a “bump” on top of a flat trend in federal stimulus for R&D.
While somewhat less likely, it is possible that some recipients, mostly large universities,
are not budget constrained and there is a substitution between ARRA research funds and
institutions’ own resources. However, universities’ own institutional spending on R&D
continued to increase over this time period according to the Higher Education Research
and Development (HERD) survey. Recent economics literature provides evidence that
federal aid caused universities to increase their investment in research and human capital
[Dinerstein et al., 2014]. The same study acknowledges a slight reduction in endowment
spending for private universities and state appropriations for public universities. These
findings can be interpreted as a substitution effect but it is not sizable.
Yet, there are challenges in measuring the effect of ARRA research spending on local
employment. The awards are not assigned randomly. There is a possibility that the
counties receiving ARRA research awards are different from other counties. We use a
Heckman-type correction to account for non-random selection of counties into receiving
ARRA research awards. We estimate the probability of a county receiving an ARRA
research award using all control variables and two good predictors of a county receiving
ARRA research stimulus. They are a dummy for a research university in a county and a
dummy for having any people employed in R&D and science services in a county before
the recession. We estimate the following selection equation using probit:
Sc = 1[ARRA Resc > 0]
Sc = δs + δ1Res Unic + δ2Res Countyc,2007 +XcΨ + υc,
whereRes Unic is the dummy variable for a county with research university, Res Countyc,2007
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is the dummy for a county with employment in R&D and science services in 2007, δs is
a state-level shock, and υc is an error term.
We construct an inverse Mills ratio, λˆc, using predicted values from the estimated
probit model. The inverse Mills ratio corrects the bias from non-random selection of
counties into receiving ARRA research stimulus in a sample of counties with non-zero
ARRA research awards.
We need to account for the endogeneity of ARRA research stimulus. This endogeneity
is, in principle, less serious than for other types of federal spending, such as spending on
unemployment or housing. Research awards are not assigned based on the socio-economic
conditions of a county. Recipients received ARRA funds based on peer review, innovative
potential, or existing infrastructure for scientific and technological discovery. Even though
research awards are not based on socio-economic conditions of a county, they cannot be
considered independent of them. The data show that counties with large research awards
are more populous, urban, aﬄuent, and have more complex industrial structure. One
possibility is that counties with large research awards grow faster than counties with
small awards. Another possibility is that counties with large research awards can smooth
recessions better and have little room to add new jobs during the recovery.
We employ an instrumental variable strategy to account for resulting endogeneity. We
use two different predictors of ARRA research stimulus, a natural logarithm of doctoral
degrees awarded at the universities in a county in 2010 and the number of people employed
in R&D and science services per capita before recession, as instruments. We also include
the inverse Mills ratio, λˆc, in the first stage to correct for the selection bias in ARRA
counties with research awards:
ARRA Resc
1
5
Σ2013n=2009Popc,n
= φs + φ1 ln(Doc Degreesc,2010) + φ2
Res Empc,2007
Popc,2007
+ φ3λˆc +XcΩ + ξc,
where φs is state-level shock, Res Empc,2007 is the number of individuals employed in
R&D and scientific services in county c in 2007, Doc Degreesc,2010 is the number of
doctoral degrees awarded in county c in 2010, and ξc is the error term.
Our baseline estimate comes from the following cross-county instrumental variable
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regression on a sub-sample of counties with ARRA research awards:
Empc,2013 − Empc,2009
1
5
Σ2013n=2009Popc,n
= κs + βIV
ARRA Resc
1
5
Σ2013n=2009Popc,n
+XcΘ + ηc,
where κs is state-level shock, and ηc is the error term.
2.3 Data
Total ARRA spending was an estimated $831 billion34, including contract, grant, and
loan awards, expansion of entitlement programs, such as food stamps and unemployment
insurance, direct grants to states, Medicaid match program, tax benefits and federal gov-
ernment consumption and investment. We will focus on ARRA transfers to individuals,
businesses, and local institutions. The total amount of ARRA contract, grant, and loan
awards reported by recipients is approximately $278 billion, or about one-third of all
ARRA spending.35 This number does not include other components of ARRA.
Our main data source is the Cumulative National Summary of ARRA recipient re-
ports.36 The data contains reports from local governments, private entities, and individ-
uals on the amount of stimulus received under ARRA.
The data on the Cumulative National Summary of Recipient Level Reports has a
multi-level structure. Figure 2.1 provides an example to illustrate the hierarchy of ARRA
award recipients in the data.
We observe the flow of funds from primary contractor to subcontractors and vendors.
Most recipients disclose a place of performance (POP) with a five-digit zip code. We
supplement zip codes from vendors’ DUNS using Dun & Bradstreet Unique Partner
Identification Key. We then map zip codes to US counties using US Census Zip Code
Tabulation Area, look-up feature of Melissa Data, and HUD USPS zip code crosswalk
34Original estimate was $787 billion. It was later adjusted up, to $831 billion [Congressional Budget
Office, 2012].
35Author calculations based on the recipient reports in the Cumulative National Summary.
36 We downloaded the last version of these reports from the Federal Procurement Data System on
October 26, 2015. The data collection at recipient level was finalized on September 30, 2015. There will
be no further updates to this data set [Clark, 2015]. Before September 2015, this data was hosted on
Recovery.gov.
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files. Zip codes that cover two or more counties were assigned weights based on the
county population share in the zip code using HUD USPS zip code crosswalk file. Table
2.1 presents the results of matching recipients’ POPs to US counties. We match $270,334
million of ARRA awards from the Cumulative National Summary to a POP in a US
county. Because ARRA reports allow us to trace both disbursement to a primary recipient
as well as subcontracts we are able to trace spending with a high degree of local specificity.
In other words, these data provide new and heretofore unused information about the
national geography of R&D stimulus spending and thus support the local, county-level,
models we estimate.
County level spending data are matched to public information about employment.
We use data on total county employment and county employment in the private sector
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages
(QCEW).37 We use annual average employment because we do not know specific dates
of ARRA spending shocks to county employment.38 We use data on total employment in
a county to account for both direct and indirect job creation following ARRA stimulus
and avoid the issue of overestimating the number of jobs if employees are switching jobs
to fill in the positions funded by ARRA in the same county [Jones and Rothschild, 2011].
We use the QCEW for a control variable, the number of manufacturing jobs per capita
in a county before the recession. For the number of people employed in R&D and science,
we use data on county-level employment in scientific research and development services
(NAICS (2012) code 5417) from the US Census County Business Patterns.
The literature in economics does not provide an established definition of research
spending. We thus calculate two alternate measures of R&D spending that rely on the
37 The Cumulative National Summary of ARRA recipient reports contains information on the number
of jobs reported by ARRA recipients. We do not use this data for three reasons. First, they do not
account for the jobs created indirectly, by recipients spending their income in the local economy. Second,
the jobs are reported by the primary contractor and should represent the sum of all jobs created or
retained by primary contractor as well as its vendors, subcontractors, and their sub-vendors. We can not
track these jobs to the geographic location of subcontractors, vendors, and sub-vendors. Third, these job
numbers are approximations resulting from primary contractors’ uncertain knowledge about the linkage
of ARRA spending to a specific job, as well as recipients’ lack of incentive to calculate them precisely.
38 The Federal Procurement Data System provides the data on spending disbursed over five-year period
from 2009 to 2013 and spending disbursed in Q4 2013. We, therefore, can not construct a panel as the
timing of disbursement at a quarter-level is not available.
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missions of federal agencies that made grants and the purposes reported specifically for
ARRA spending. Calculating those measures relies on two data sources, the Catalog of
Federal Domestic Assistance (CFDA) and “Where Does the Money Go?” map from the
Recovery.gov website, to define ARRA funds which contribute to R&D and science.
For every US county, we track research spending under ARRA to the zipcodes within
its borders and also to the adjacent counties. We determine adjacent counties using US
Census data on county adjacency from 2010.
All employment and ARRA spending variables are scaled by county population from
the US Census Annual Estimates of the Resident Population by County.
To control for the type of county, we identify metro counties using Rural-urban Con-
tinuum Codes (2013) published by the US Department of Agriculture and counties with
research universities using the Carnegie Classification (2010) and the Post-secondary
University Survey (2013) published by the US Department of Education. We obtain the
number of doctorate degrees awarded in a county from the Carnegie Classification (2010).
The variables and their data sources are summarized in Table 2.2.
2.4 Definition of Research Spending
We employ two definitions of R&D and science spending. Our main definition is based
on the CFDA numbers: we identified 24 numbers describing scientific and research activ-
ities funded under ARRA. The CFDA numbers which mention the following are classified
as research funding: research, science, census, statistics, policy evaluation, data, surveys,
studies, laboratories, analysis, university building capacity. The CFDA numbers that
mention library, education, including higher education, conservation, museums, training
are not classified as research funding. Complete list of research CFDA numbers and
allocated funds are in Table 2.3.
The secondary definition comes from “Where does the money go?” section of the
Recovery.gov website. The section depicted a map with locations of ARRA recipients.
The users could search an award based on different characteristics, including its purpose.
All funds labeled “for R&D and Science” enter our secondary definition.
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The data on the type of funds released on the Recovery.gov website were matched to
the outlays data from the Cumulative National Summary.39
We use two definitions to recover missing values. We classify transactions with missing
CFDA numbers based on the Recovery.gov data. Similarly, the transactions that were not
matched to the data from “Where Does the Money Go?” feature are classified as R&D
and science based on their CFDA number. The comparison of two definitions is in Table
2.4. Because our coding of CFDA numbers allows us to identify not only spending by
traditional science agencies (e.g. the National Institute of Health and National Science
Foundation) as well as programs within other agencies that are focused on R&D, the
estimate of research spending using that definition is higher than that reported by the
Recovery.gov.
Descriptive Analysis
Tables 2.5 and 2.6 show the breakdown of ARRA spending by year. Table 2.5 breaks
ARRA awards by the year in which they were assigned to recipient, while Table 2.6 shows
the year of the final report filed by recipients indicating work completion. We can see
that the majority of awards were assigned in 2009 and completed in 2013. The pattern
is similar for research and non-research awards with one caveat. While the percentage
of awards assigned early, in 2009, is similar - 59% of research awards and 62% of non-
research awards, research projects took longer to complete. Sixty percent of recipients of
research awards filed final report in the last year (2013) as compared to 44% of recipients
of non-research awards. The average time between receiving an award and filing a final
report is 772 days for non-research projects and 890 days for research projects.40 This
finding is consistent with the notion that R&D and science projects are more long-term
39 The data on the purpose of funds is only available for primary contractors and subcontractors. We
assume the same purpose for their vendors. The data on the purpose of funds does not have id variable
award key. We used award number and order number as id variables. Some of the values are either miss-
ing or inconsistent with corresponding variables in the main data. We matched 99.02% of transactions,
which represent 87.08% of outlay amounts, based on three variables: award type, award number, and
order number.
40Author calculations. We do not observe the date of the final report, only its year and quarter. We
assign the date as the 45th day of respective quarter.
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and uncertain, but may also have to do with standard university reporting practices for
grant awards.
Tables 2.7 and 2.8 contain the data on the counties with the largest amounts in re-
search awards under ARRA. Table 2.7 shows that the counties with the largest aggregate
amounts are located on the coasts or in large metropolitan areas. Among the top 25 coun-
ties, five are in California, each grossing at least 400 million USD in total ARRA funds on
research, two are in Massachusetts, two in New York, two in Maryland, and Washington
DC. Cook County in Illinois, Harris and Dallas Counties in Texas, Wayne County in
Michigan, Philadelphia and Allegheny Counties in Pennsylvania, Wake County in North
Carolina, Milwaukee County in Wisconsin, Maricopa County in Arizona, Miami-Dade
County in Florida, Hamilton County in Ohio, Kong County in Washington are homes
to large cities with complex industrial structures. Washtenaw County in Michigan is the
location of the University of Michigan, the largest public university performer of research.
It is important to remember that counties with the largest aggregate amounts of re-
search awards are not necessarily the most research-intensive. After scaling ARRA awards
by population the coastal areas and counties with large cities are no longer prominent.
Figure 2.2 displays the largest recipients of research spending under ARRA in aggre-
gate and per capita terms at a county level. A little over half of all the counties received
some research funds between 2009 and 2013. However, the distribution of awards, even
when examined per capita, is skewed. About one-third of all counties received more than
5 USD per capita over five years. 382 counties received more than 50 USD per capita,
244 more than 100 USD per capita, and 34 counties more than 500 USD per capita.
The list of counties with the largest amounts in research awards is different if compiled
on per capita basis. Suffolk county in Massachusetts and Washtenaw County in Michigan
are the only counties from Table 2.7 to appear in Table 2.8, which displays the top 25
counties on per capita basis.
Some of the counties enter Table 2.8 due to low population numbers. If the denom-
inator in the per capita definition of research awards is small, even 10 million USD in
federal awards over five years will place a county at the top of the list, as evidenced
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by Esmeralda County in Nevada. Three Nevada counties as well as three remote bor-
oughs in Alaska, Morrow County in Oregon, and Pontotoc County in Mississippi are
low population counties which received federal funds for Renewable Energy Research
and Development. Orange County in North Carolina, Washtenaw County in Michigan,
Tompkins County in New York, and Suffolk County in Massachusetts are homes to large
research universities. Delphi Corp, a recipient of a large grant in Conservation R&D,
has one of its main offices in Kokomo, Howard County. Los Alamos County is on the
list due to the grants of the Los Alamos National Laboratory from the National Science
Foundation (NSF) and the Department of Energy (DOE). Anderson County in Tennessee
is a home of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Marinette County in Wisconsin is on
the list mainly because of the two large contracts of Marinette Marine Corp. with the
NSF and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).
Table 2.9 compares counties with research spending and counties with spending on
all other purposes. Between 2009 and 2013, every county received some ARRA awards
for purposes other than research. About half of all counties received ARRA stimulus for
R&D and science in the same time period. The counties with research awards are more
populous, urban, twice as likely to have a research university, and have more individuals
employed in scientific research and development services. More doctoral degrees are
awarded in the counties with ARRA research awards. They are similar to all other
counties in the share of individuals employed in manufacturing and the increase in the
unemployment rate during the Great Recession.
Tables 2.10 and 2.11 examine the geographical dispersion of ARRA awards. Table
2.10 includes all awards. Table 2.11 excludes awards with only one recipient.41 We
separate awards with many recipients because subcontractors and vendors change the
geography of spending. They are often overlooked at a less granular analyses of fiscal
spending, resulting in attenuated estimates. Both tables show the same pattern: primary
contractors on research awards are more likely than primary contractors on non-research
awards to have subcontractors and vendors outside their zip code, county, and state.
41 By default, these awards have all transactions and 100% amount in the same zip code, county, and
state. They constitute about 60% of all awards in the data.
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However, the relative amounts they are sending to other zip codes and counties are smaller
than corresponding amounts sent by primary contractors on all other awards. Primary
contractors on research send, on average, 12% of the total award amount outside their
zip code, including 10% of the total amount going outside the county. Corresponding
percentages for primary contractors on non-research awards are 17 and 13. The pattern
reverses at the state level. Primary contractors on research awards send, on average, 8%
of total award amounts outside their state, while primary contractors on non-research
awards do so with only 3% of award amounts. This pattern is inconclusive about the
“stickiness” of research awards in comparison to all other awards. However, it is evident
that research contractors have more remote subcontractors and vendors. This finding is
expected as research contracts require specialized materials, processes, and services.
Table 2.12 shows summary statistics for the 3,102 counties in the sample. The top
panel shows details on outcome variables, total employment and private sector employ-
ment, denoted as changes per capita. On average, total county employment per capita
rose by about 0.8% between 2009 and 2013. During the same time period, average private
sector employment increased by about 1%.
The next panel shows the details on ARRA spending variables. A little over half of all
counties received some federal funds on research under ARRA. The average amount was
$34 per capita over five years, from 2009 to 2013. In contrast, every US county received
some ARRA funds for purposes other than research and the average amount is more than
twenty times higher, $824 per capita, over the same period.
We use two instruments, an indicator that a county has a research university and an
indicator that a county has at least one person employed in R&D and science in 2007,
in the selection equation. We use three instruments, different from the first two, in the
first stage of IV regression. They are the number of individuals employed in R&D per
capita in 2007, the natural logarithm of doctoral degrees awarded in 2010, and the inverse
Mills ratio. According to the Carnegie Classification (2010), 205, or 6.5% of, US counties
have a research university. According to the County Business Patterns, only 11.3% of US
counties have at least one individual employed in R&D in 2007. On average, a county had
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304 individuals employed in R&D for every million residents. In contrast, there were, on
average, 46,257 individuals employed in manufacturing per million residents in the same
year. The numbers for the doctoral degrees are similarly skewed. On average, there were
19 doctoral degrees awarded in a US county in 2010, but the 90th percentile is zero.
The bottom panel contains information on employment change during the recession.
On average, between 2007 and 2009, total employment in a county fell by 1.5%. The
corresponding number for private sector employment is 1.6%.
2.5 Baseline Results
2.5.1 Heckman Correction
Table 2.13 presents the estimates from the probit regression42 used to correct for
selection of counties into receiving ARRA research awards. The outcome variable is a
dummy for a county with non-zero ARRA spending on research. Column 1 shows the
results of the baseline regression. Column 2 presents the same regression as in Column 1
using the secondary definition of research spending. Column 3 gives results for the same
regression as in Column 1 substituting total employment with private sector employment.
The counties with ARRA research awards are different from the rest of the country.
They are more urban, more likely to have a research university and individuals employed
in R&D and science, and are more likely to be surrounded by the counties that also
received ARRA research stimulus. According to the baseline specification, at least one
R&D job in a county in 2007 increases the probability of receiving ARRA research awards
by 33%. A research university in a county increases the probability of receiving ARRA
research awards by 55%. Urban counties are, on average, 24% more likely to receive
ARRA research awards. One thousand USD in ARRA research awards per capita received
by adjacent counties increases the probability of the focal county getting ARRA research
funds by 39%, suggesting that this spending, like other R&D measures, is subject to
agglomeration effects. One standard deviation increase in employment in manufacturing
per capita increases the probability of receiving ARRA research funds by 4%.
42 We present marginal effects for easier interpretation of coefficients.
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Negative coefficients on the change in employment during recession suggest that coun-
ties that were later awarded ARRA stimulus on research fared better during the recession.
The consequences of that are not clear. The counties with ARRA research awards may
have slower growth rates because there is less room for new jobs during the recovery, or
higher post-recession growth rates because they, in general, have better socio-economic
profiles, or a mix of both.
We use the estimates from the Heckman correction regression to construct the inverse
Mills ratio. We include it in the first stage regression on a subsample of counties with
ARRA research awards. It corrects for the selection of counties into receiving ARRA
stimulus for R&D and science by controlling the part of the error term for which selection
into getting funded affects the funding amount.
2.5.2 First Stage
Table 2.14 provides first-stage results of the IV regression. In all specifications, the
instruments are good predictors of the endogeneous variable, ARRA spending on research.
The baseline specification shows that conditional on receiving ARRA stimulus, one extra
person employed in R&D and science before the recession, increases research spending
under ARRA by 15,300 USD. Likewise, a one percent increase in awarded doctorates in
a county increases ARRA research spending by 19 USD per capita. These magnitudes
are large. From descriptive statistics, we know that less than one-tenth of all counties
received more than 100 USD in ARRA spending on research per capita. However, the
number of counties where any doctorate degrees were awarded in 2010 is small - 312.
The number of counties with more than a thousand people employed in R&D and science
services in 2007 is even smaller: 89.
The inverse Mills ratio from the selection model is positively signed but not statisti-
cally significant in all three specifications. It suggests that unobserved factors that make
counties more likely to get ARRA stimulus on research are also associated with larger
amounts in stimulus per capita but the relationship is not statistically significant.
The robust first-stage F-statistic in the baseline specification is 17. The same statistic
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in the regression which uses our second definition of R&D and science spending is 21.
The F-statistic in private employment regression is 28.
2.5.3 Main Results
Table 2.15 presents an endogeneous OLS regression in Column 1 and second-stage
results of the IV regressions in Columns 2-4. The outcome variable in each regression is
the change in employment in a county from 2009 to 2013 per capita. The OLS estimate
of the jobs multiplier is 14 with a p-value below 0.01. The coefficient on the IV estimate
is much higher, 27, with a p-value below 0.01. Between 2009 and 2013, on average, a
county added 27 new jobs in response to one million USD in ARRA research spending.
The estimate is roughly the same if we use the secondary definition of ARRA research
spending. The majority of jobs, 23 out of 27, were in the private sector.
The OLS estimate is much smaller than the IV estimate suggesting a negative corre-
lation between the change in employment and unobserved characteristics of counties with
high research spending. This finding is consistent with the notion that these counties had
less room to add new jobs during the recovery.
The effect of an increase in research spending per capita in adjacent counties is positive
and statistically significant in IV specifications. We scale the coefficient by the average
of the ratio of the population in adjacent counties to the population of the focal county
to make the coefficient comparable to the coefficient in the change in employment in
the focal county. The coefficients range from 0.9 to 1.2 and are statistically significant.
The OLS coefficient equals 0.3 and is not statistically significant. This result rules out
negative spillover effects of research spending. The IV specifications suggest that there
are positive spillover effects - a county adds jobs in response to research spending in
adjacent counties. The coefficients in IV regressions imply one additional job added in a
county in response to one million USD in research spending in adjacent counties. Overall,
our baseline estimate suggests that one million USD in R&D stimulus spending generated
27 jobs in the county that received the award and one job in counties adjacent to it.
The coefficients on all other ARRA spending are negative and significant. They dis-
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play a well-known selection effect: federal stimulus goes disproportionately to the counties
with worse economic conditions. The initial economic conditions in these counties mask
improvements from the federal stimulus. This variable is included as a control and we
are not instrumenting for it.
Among other control variables, a dummy for urban counties is consistently positive
and significant across all specifications, the number employed in manufacturing before
recession is positive and statistically significant in IV specifications, and the change in
employment due to recession changes sign based on specification and is not statistically
significant. The county-specific trend in employment change is positive but not statisti-
cally significant across all specifications.
2.6 Robustness Checks
In Table 2.16, we build the baseline model one variable at a time. The unconditional
effect of instrumented ARRA research spending on a sample of counties with ARRA
research awards is 36 additional jobs. All control variables impact the coefficient. The
largest reduction in the magnitude of the coefficient comes from adding an indicator
for Metro County to the model suggesting strong positive correlation between the size
of ARRA research spending per capita and a level of urbanization. The changes in
the coefficient of interest from the addition of control variables to the model indicate
positive correlation between the size of ARRA research spending and the size of ARRA
research spending in adjacent counties and negative correlation between the size of ARRA
research spending and the size of all other ARRA spending, in per capita terms. Across
all specifications in Table 2.16, the coefficient on ARRA research spending varies from
22 to 42.
The three instrumental variable regressions from Table 2.15, including the baseline
specification, are presented in Table 2.17 with omitted selection stage and inverted Mills
ratio. The coefficients are larger than respective main results, ranging from 32 to 38. This
result suggest large selection bias in ARRA award assignments stemming from underlying
capabilities of a county to carry out R&D and science activities.
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In Table 2.18, we evaluate the robustness of baseline results by splitting the sample.
One possible concern is that the baseline results are driven by coastal counties with devel-
oped research infrastructure, such as California and Massachusetts. In the first column,
we report baseline estimates after dropping counties in Massachusetts and California.
The estimate changes very little, from 27 to 25 jobs in response to one million USD in
ARRA research spending over the five year period. It remains statistically significant
with p-value less than 0.01.
The second column shows results for counties without research universities.43 This
time the change is more pronounced. The coefficient reduces by one third, from 27 to 18
jobs, but is still significant. This finding suggests that the results are disproportionately
driven by counties with research universities. It is hardly surprising as ARRA research
stimulus is complimentary to the infrastructure for R&D and science.
The third column checks if results are affected by remote, low populated counties and
boroughs in Nevada and Alaska. They received high per capita research awards which
are low in aggregate terms. The baseline specification omitting Alaska and Nevada shows
a coefficient almost identical to the coefficient obtained from the baseline suggesting that
counties in Nevada and Alaska were on average very similar in their return to ARRA
research spending to the average county in the sample.
Finally, the fourth column checks if large metropolitan areas with top 25 aggregate
ARRA research award drive the results. The change is rather large with coefficient
dropping to 21 but not as large as omitting counties with research universities.
We also check for the possibility that our main result may be driven by spurious
correlation. We estimate the baseline regression omitting the main variable of interest,
ARRA research spending, and the county-specific change in employment trend44 using
OLS:
Empc,t − Empc,2009
1
5
Σtn=2009Popc,n
= κ˜s +X
∗
cΘ˜ + η˜c,
43 We cannot use dummy for research university in the selection equation because by construction
none of the counties in this specification have research university.
44 We use the data on the change in employment before 2009 to construct county-specific change in
employment trend. The same data are used to construct the outcome variable in robustness regressions.
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where X∗c is a vector of control variables without the change in employment trend, κ˜s
is state-level shock, and η˜c is an error term.
We predict the change in employment using control variables for several time periods
before the recession45 (2009-2002, 2009-2003, 2009-2004 etc.) and for several time periods
after the recession (2009-2010, 2009-2011, etc). In the absence of spurious correlation,
the effect of ARRA research spending is included in the residuals of post-recession regres-
sions but should not be present in the residuals of pre-recession regressions. We construct
predicted ARRA research spending using a linear combination of instruments from the
first-stage regression (the number of persons employed in R&D per capita in 2007, the
natural logarithm of doctoral degrees awarded in a county in 2010, and the inverse Mills
ratio from the selection equation). We regress the residuals from the employment re-
gressions on predicted ARRA spending on research. The results are in Figure 2.3. The
estimated coefficient is around zero for pre-recession periods indicating that conditional
on control variables there is no spurious correlation between the change in employment
and instrumental variables. Positive and significant coefficients in the post-recession pe-
riod are picking up the correlation between the effect of ARRA spending included in the
residual and instrumental variables.
2.7 Discussion
2.7.1 Job-Years
We assess the magnitude of our main result by calculating the yearly cost of a job.
In the data, we do not observe yearly payments to recipients but we can examine the
relationship between ARRA awards and the change in employment over different lengths
of time. Table 2.19 shows the coefficients from the regression of the change in employment
on ARRA research spending in focal and adjacent counties. One million USD in ARRA
stimulus on research added 4 jobs from 2009 to 2010, 16 jobs from 2009 to 2011, 19
jobs from 2009 to 2012, and 27 jobs from 2009 to 2013 in focal counties. Additionally,
45 We omit 2009-2007 and 2009-2008 because the change in employment between 2007 and 2009 is
included in the baseline specification as a control variable.
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one job was added from 2009 to 2012 and one job was added from 2009 to 2013 in
adjacent counties, with no jobs added or destroyed in earlier period. If we assume that
all new jobs lasted for the whole year and no new jobs were created in response to ARRA
after 2013, then the total number of job-years created in response to one million USD
in ARRA research spending is the sum of the coefficients from four regressions in Table
2.19. We get a total of 66 job-years with a standard error of 13.46 We interpret this
result with caution because an overidentification test fails for regressions on the change
in employment in 2009-2010 and 2009-2011. A similar result using OLS is 30 job-years
with a standard error of 2 (Table 2.20). These estimates convert to approximately 15,000
USD per job-year using our baseline specification and 33,000 USD per job-year using
endogenous OLS regression suggesting large selection bias. Regardless of any longer term
economic benefits that accrue to R&D supported by ARRA spending, these investments
resulted in significant employment stimulus effects. The cost is further reduced if we add
jobs created in adjacent counties to our calculation.
2.7.2 State-level Results
In order to compare our findings to other published models, we attempt to estimate
baseline results at the state level. We have to make changes to the main specification
to obtain state-level estimates. First, we are no longer applying the Heckman correction
because there is no selection into receiving ARRA spending on research at the state level.
Every state was awarded some R&D and science funding between 2009 and 2013. We
can no longer include control for ARRA research spending in adjacent counties. Instead
of a dummy variable controlling for metro counties, we add a state-level measure of
urbanization, defined as the number of metro counties in a state.
The instrumental variable strategy has to be modified as well. The number of doctoral
students aggregated at a state level is no longer a good predictor of ARRA R&D and
science spending. Therefore, we no longer include it as an instrument. Without the
46 We calculate the standard error on the job-year cost estimates using Delta method. We assume
asymptotic normality and independence for the coefficients on ARRA research spending in Tables 2.19
and 2.20.
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inverse Mills ratio from the selection model and the number of doctoral students as
instruments, we are left with Employed in R&D and science per capita (2007) as the only
instrument in our baseline specification. Due to small sample size, we use conventional
standard errors.
We present the state level results in Table 2.21. We are not able to obtain a precise
estimate of the effect of ARRA R&D and science spending. The coefficient on the main
variable of interest is large, larger than comparable magnitudes at the county level, but
so are standard errors. The robust first stage F-statistic for the main regression is 12.82.
Table 2.21 provides no evidence of negative spillover effects within a state. If research-
intensive counties were to “steal” already employed people from other counties in a state,
the coefficient estimate in the state-level regression should be smaller than the respective
estimate at the county-level.
The magnitude of the coefficient suggests that the variation in the effect of ARRA
spending across states within a region is larger than the variation across counties within
a state.
2.7.3 Comparison to the Estimates in the Literature
We compare our baseline estimate to the results in recent studies using similar method-
ology.47 We find that our multiplier is large in comparison to the results in other studies.48
Wilson [2012] applies cross-state IV methodology to analyze the effect of ARRA grants
on total non-farm employment. The estimated effect suggests a cost of $125,000 per job-
year in the first year of disbursement. It is higher than our estimate of $15,000 per job-
year, or our state-level results, which are not measured precisely. Shorter time-horizon,
the analysis at the county level, the possibility of jobs created by ARRA lasting past the
first year, as well as the possibility of the R&D and science spending having a higher
multiplier can explain the differences between our estimate and a smaller estimate in
47 We are not comparing our estimates to the results from macroeconomic models, such as Blinder and
Zandi [2010] and reports by the CEA and CBO. The direct comparison of local and national multipliers
requires a number of assumptions which do not hold in our case.
48 Chodorow-Reich [2017] contains a review of the recent literature on geographic cross-sectional fiscal
spending multipliers.
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Wilson [2012].
Chodorow-Reich et al. [2012] apply similar methodology to estimate the effect of
ARRA Medicaid reimbursements at a state level. They use past Medicaid spending per
capita as an instrument for ARRA stimulus and find a cost of $26,000 per job-year.
Conley and Dupor [2013] find a much smaller multiplier, $202,000 per job-year, using
ARRA obligations. Leduc and Wilson [2013] estimate employment regression49 as part
of their study of the flypaper effect. They estimate a cost of job-year as $62,500 for
highway grants over a three year period (2008-2011).
These papers estimate effects within the first two years of ARRA, at the state level and
using the data on the federal grants to states with a breakdown by agency. Our baseline
estimate comes from county-level data from the direct recipients of ARRA contracts and
grants. The data are broken down by CFDA numbers, a more granular measure than the
breakdown by funding department, over five years of full ARRA disbursement.
Feyrer and Sacerdote [2011] use ARRA recipient-level reports on all types of spending
at the county level in the first twenty months of ARRA disbursement and estimate a cost
of $400,000 per job year. They locate about $85 billion in spending at the county level,
while we locate about $270 billion. They also estimate state-level effect of approximately
$111,000 per job year.50 Similarly to Feyrer and Sacerdote [2011], our state-level estimates
are higher than the county-level estimates. They attribute it to the positive spillover
effects on employment. A non-ARRA paper estimating multiplier at the county level is
Serrato and Wingender [2016]. They document a cost of $30,000 per job year.
A direct comparison of our study to recent literature is complicated by the differences
in methodology, data sources for employment and ARRA spending, and the time period
during which the stimulus was disbursed to recipients. It is, however, evident that our
estimate of the R&D and science multiplier is larger than the estimates of the common
multiplier or multipliers on other types of spending in the recent literature. In other
words, our findings at the county level imply both that R&D spending has significant
49 Employment regressions are in Table 8 of 2014 working version of their 2017 paper.
50 We take the estimate in Column 1 of Table 3 because the specification is closest available comparison
to our specification.
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stimulus effects and that those effects are larger than those that have been reported for
many other types of federal stimulus.
2.8 Conclusion
We examine the impact of ARRA R&D and science spending on local employment.
Cross-county IV regressions indicate that ARRA spending on R&D and science has sub-
stantively large, positive, statistically significant effects on employment at the county
level. We find that between 2009 and 2013, the full ARRA disbursement period, 27 jobs
were added in response to one million in spending on research. The majority of jobs, 23
out of 27, were in private sector. Additional analysis provides an estimate of the cost
per job-year. We find that 66 job-years were created from one million USD in ARRA
research funds which converts to the cost of about $15,000 per job-year. Split sample
regressions suggest that the effect is larger for counties with research universities.
Overall, the effect of ARRA spending on R&D and science estimated in our paper is
larger than comparable results for federal stimulus in general as well as federal stimulus
on health or infrastructure. In addition to any longer term returns realized to discovery
and training conducted in the course of ARRA funding R&D, there are substantial short
term employment returns to public investments in science and research.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 2.1: An example of ARRA award flows
Primary Contractor:
University of Michigan
Population Studies Center
$3,332,248
Vendor:
Precision Bioservices, Inc.
$287,366
Subcontractor:
University of Iowa
$118,876
Subcontractor:
University of Southern California
$63,087
Subcontractor:
Johns Hopkins University
$1,300,150
Subcontractor:
Columbia University
$226,542
Vendor:
NIH Genetics Lab
$675,350
1
Grant name: Expanding a National Resource for Genetic Research in Behavioral & Health Sciences.
Grant description: This project will utilize high-throughput genetic technologies in a major longitu-
dinal behavioral study and renew the biomedical research community by building scientific partnerships
for the integration of behavioral and genetic science. The 7,000 individual participants to be genotyped
will be added to a database of 13,000 being constructed under an earlier ARRA project.
Funding agency: NIH.
Award number: 1 RC4 AG 039029-01.
Total amount: $6,003,620.
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Figure 2.3: Robustness Check, Spurious Correlation
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Notes: The graph examines the possibility of spurious correlation in the main result. We estimate the regression of the residuals from the
baseline specification after omitting ARRA research spending on the predicted values of ARRA research spending. The predicted ARRA
research spending is constructed using the instruments from the first stage. The year on the horizontal axis indicates the t in the outcome
variable
Empc,t−Empc,2009
1
5
Σtn=2009Popc,n
in the post-recession baseline regressions and
Empc,2009−Empc,t
1
5
Σtn=2009Popc,n
in the pre-recession baseline regressions used
to construct residuals. The vertical axes contains the coefficients from the regression of residuals on the predicted ARRA research spending
for each time period. We omit 2009-2007 and 2009-2008 because the change in employment between 2007 and 2009 is included in the baseline
specification as a control variable.
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Table 2.1: Sample Construction.
Data Obs
Raw Data 615,226
Awards with Primary Contractor 615,189
Total Award Amount is not missing 615,188
Transactions without duplicate Primary Contractor 615,171
Transactions without duplicate Subcontractor 615,162
Transactions without duplicate Subcontractor’s Vendor 615,150
Transactions without negative local amount 613,224
Non-zero local amounts 564,588
Non-missing local amounts 557,003
Country is US, PR, VI, or missing 556,535
Zipcode is not missing and can be matched to a county 552,384
Notes: The table contains information on sample construction. All observations are at transaction level. Transaction level is the most
granular level and includes information on amounts received by primary contractors, subcontractors, and vendors separately. Transactions
are linked to places of performance and their five-digit zip codes.
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Table 2.4: Comparison Table for Definitions of Research Spending
Agency CFDA Recovery.gov
Department of Energy 11,097.60 3,479.20
National Institutes of Health 9,827.35 9,793.66
National Science Foundation 2,966.76 2,731.93
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 867.47 867.47
Department of Health and Human Services (other than NIH) 733.22 645.81
Department of Commerce 525.32 524.37
Department of Defense 342.33 341.53
Department of Interior 21.92 0.04
Department of Homeland Security 0.48 0.00
Department of Transportation 0.30 66.49
General Services Administration 0.03 0.03
Department of Education 0.00 0.49
Total 26,382.77 18,451.01
Notes. The table contains comparison between the two definitions of research spending. The main definition uses CFDA
numbers. The secondary definition comes from “Where does the money go?” section of the Recovery.gov website.
Department of Energy: The discrepancy between two definitions arises from including CFDA numbers 81.086 (Conser-
vation R&D), 81.087 (Renewable Energy R&D), 81.122 (Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability R&D and Analysis),
and 81.135 (Advanced Research Projects Agency - Energy) in the main definition. These transactions are classified as
“Energy” in the secondary definition. Additionally, seven transactions from CFDA number 81.049 (Office of Science
Financial Assistance Program) are classified as “Energy” and “Other” in the secondary definition. Six awards under
the CFDA number 81.126 (Federal Loan Guarantees for Innovative Energy Technologies) which is not part of the main
definition, are included in the secondary definition.
National Institutes of Health: The discrepancy between two definitions arises from 30 NIH grants classified as “Other”,
“Health, and “Unemployment” (not “R&D and Science”), in the secondary definition.
National Science Foundation: The discrepancy between two definitions arises from 173 grants classified as “Infrastructure”,
“Transportation”, “Education”, or “Other” in the secondary definition.
Department of Health and Human Services: The discrepancy between two definitions arises from including CFDA numbers
93.420 (ARRA - Community Health Applied Research Network) and 93.728 (ARRA - Strategic Health IT Advanced Re-
search Projects, SHARP) in the main definition. These transactions are classified as “Health” in the secondary definition.
Additionally, one grant from CFDA number 93.726 (ARRA Accelerating Adoption of Comparative Effectiveness Research
(CER)) is classified as “Other” in the secondary definition.
Department of Commerce: One grant from CFDA number 11.609 (Measurement and Engineering Research and Standards)
is classified as “Infrastructure” in the secondary definition.
Department of Defense: The discrepancy between two definitions arises from three transactions under CFDA number
12.431 (Basic Scientific Research) which are classified as “Infrastructure” and “Other” in the secondary definition.
Department of Interior: The discrepancy between two definitions arises from including CFDA numbers 15.807 (Earthquake
Hazard Research Grants), 15.817 (National Geospacial Program), and 15.818 (Volcano Hazards Program Research and
Monitoring) in the main definition. These transactions are classified as “Energy” in the secondary definition.
Department of Homeland Security: The discrepancy between two definitions arises from including CFDA number 81.087
(Renewable Energy Research and Development) in the main definition. These transactions are classified as “Energy” in
the secondary definition.
Department of Transportation: The discrepancy between two definitions arises from including 32 grants under CFDA
number 20.205 (Highway Planning and Construction) in the secondary definition as “R&D and Science” funds. They are
classified as non-R&D and Science spending in the main definition.
Department of Education: The discrepancy between two definitions arises from including two grants under 84.033 (Federal
Work-Study Program) in the secondary definition as “R&D and Science” funds. They are classified as non-R&D and
Science spending in the main definition.
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Table 2.5: ARRA Awards Assigned by Year
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
ARRA R&D and science spending (mill USD) 14,438 9,107 610 275 221
All other ARRA spending (mill USD) 146,262 68,472 19,487 2,174 1,281
Notes: The data in the table comes from the Cumulative National Summary of ARRA Recipient Reports. The total amount constitutes
about one-third of the total ARRA package. The data in the table is split by the year in which ARRA award was assigned. ARRA spending
on research is defined using selected CFDA numbers. The discrepancy between Tables 2.5 and 2.6 comes from missing values in award date
variable.
Table 2.6: ARRA Awards Completion by Year
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
ARRA R&D and science spending (mill USD) 78 1,048 3,648 5,687 15,922
All other ARRA spending (mill USD) 3,874 20,660 59,855 54,535 110,398
Notes: The data in the table comes from the Cumulative National Summary of ARRA Recipient Reports. The total amount constitutes
about one-third of the total ARRA package. The data in the table is split by the year in which recipients filed a final report upon work
completion. ARRA spending on research is defined using selected CFDA numbers. The discrepancy between Tables 2.5 and 2.6 comes from
missing values in award date varible.
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Table 2.7: Counties with the Largest ARRA Research Spending in 2009-2013.
County State
Amount,
USD
Percent of
Total Amount
Los Angeles County CA 867,029,440 3.35
Suffolk County MA 790,944,576 3.06
Cook County IL 770,771,648 2.98
New York County NY 653,069,760 2.52
Middlesex County MA 626,809,920 2.42
San Diego County CA 546,829,824 2.11
Santa Clara County CA 500,317,344 1.93
Alameda County CA 467,040,160 1.81
Harris County TX 445,125,856 1.72
Dallas County TX 439,479,392 1.70
Wayne County MI 419,185,472 1.62
Philadelphia County PA 417,763,904 1.61
San Mateo County CA 402,788,544 1.56
Wake County NC 379,635,648 1.47
Milwaukee County WI 349,739,072 1.35
Suffolk County NY 348,517,472 1.35
Montgomery County MD 342,431,232 1.32
Baltimore city MD 333,228,384 1.29
Washtenaw County MI 313,387,072 1.21
Hamilton County OH 313,201,184 1.21
Maricopa County AZ 300,493,120 1.16
Allegheny County PA 295,211,648 1.14
Miami-Dade County FL 290,971,552 1.12
King County WA 283,775,200 1.10
District of Columbia DC 258,183,168 1.00
Top 25 . 11,155,930,112 43.12
. .
. .
. .
Top 100 . 19,557,523,456 75.59
Notes. The table lists 25 counties with the largest awards from ARRA spending on research between 2009 and 2013. ARRA spending on
research is defined using selected CFDA numbers.
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Table 2.8: Counties with the Largest ARRA Research Spending per capita in 2009-2013.
County State
Amount,
USD per cap
Percent of
Total Amount
Esmeralda County NV 12,675 0.04
Bristol Bay Borough AK 10,221 0.04
Marinette County WI 3,258 0.53
Morrow County OR 2,213 0.10
Anderson County TN 1,831 0.52
Los Alamos County NM 1,770 0.12
Pontotoc County MS 1,734 0.19
Orange County NC 1,345 0.66
Howard County IN 1,276 0.41
Eureka County NV 1,181 0.01
Lake and Peninsula Borough AK 1,094 0.01
Suffolk County MA 1,086 3.06
Tompkins County NY 989 0.39
Washtenaw County MI 912 1.21
Rutland County VT 865 0.21
Grafton County NH 843 0.28
Boulder County CO 820 0.93
Durham County NC 812 0.81
Graham County NC 794 0.03
Centre County PA 713 0.40
Noble County OK 707 0.03
Albemarle County VA 679 0.25
Schenectady County NY 660 0.38
Fairbanks North Star Borough AK 611 0.22
Pershing County NV 608 0.02
Top 25 . 10.84
. .
. .
. .
Top 100 . 43.44
Notes. The table lists 25 counties with the largest per capita awards from ARRA spending on research between 2009 and 2013. ARRA
spending on research is defined using selected CFDA numbers.
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Table 2.9: Summary Statistics for Counties with ARRA Research Awards vs. All Coun-
ties
ARRA, R&D and Science All Counties
mean mean
Employment (2013) 74,257 41,058
Population (2013) 177,643 100,782
Change in Employment per cap
(2007-2009) -0.0181 -0.0151
County with Research University 0.13 0.07
County with Employed in R&D (2007) 0.21 0.11
Metro County 0.55 0.37
Employed in Manufacturing
per cap (2007) 0.051 0.046
Employed in R&D per cap (2007) 0.001 0.000
Doctoral Degrees in a County (2010) 37 19
Observations 1584 3102
Notes: The table contains summary statistics separately for counties with non-zero ARRA spending on research in comparison to all
other counties. The unit of analysis is a county. ARRA spending on research is defined using selected CFDA numbers.
County with Research University is an indicator which equals one if a county has R1, R2, or R3 University by the definition in Carnegie
Classification (2010). Metro County is an indicator variable which takes the value of one if a county is a Metropolitan County by the definition
in 2013 Rural-urban Continuum Codes. Employed in R&D and Employed in Manufacturing in 2007 are scaled by the county population in 2007.
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Table 2.10: ARRA Spending Dispersion (All Awards)
All other, mean R&D and Science, mean diff t-stat
Transactions (%)
Different Zipcode 0.19 0.26 -0.07 -20.65
Different County 0.16 0.24 -0.08 -25.38
Different State 0.10 0.23 -0.12 -43.01
Amount(%)
Different Zipcode 0.17 0.12 0.05 27.37
Different County 0.13 0.10 0.03 16.59
Different State 0.03 0.08 -0.05 -34.06
Notes. The table shows the dispersion of ARRA research awards in comparison to all other ARRA awards. The data are summarized
using all awards, including awards with one recipient (primary contractor). The top panel shows the percent of transactions with place of
performance (POP) outside primary contractor’s zip code, county, and state. The bottom panel shows the percent of award amount received
by the subcontractors and vendors registered outside primary contractor’s zip code, county, and state. ARRA spending on research is defined
using selected CFDA numbers.
Table 2.11: ARRA Spending Dispersion (Awards with at least one vendor or subcontrac-
tor)
All other, mean R&D and Science, mean diff t-stat
Transactions (%)
Different Zipcode 0.57 0.85 -0.28 -53.43
Different County 0.49 0.80 -0.31 -55.63
Different State 0.30 0.75 -0.45 -76.36
Amount(%)
Different Zipcode 0.50 0.38 0.12 27.71
Different County 0.39 0.34 0.06 12.70
Different State 0.10 0.27 -0.17 -45.35
Notes. The table shows the dispersion of ARRA research awards in comparison to all other ARRA awards. The data excludes awards
with one recipient (primary contractor). The top panel shows the percent of transactions with place of performance (POP) outside primary
contractor’s zip code, county, and state. The bottom panel shows the percent of award amount received by the subcontractors and vendors
registered outside primary contractor’s zip code, county, and state. ARRA spending on research is defined using selected CFDA numbers.
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Table 2.12: County Summary Statistics (2009-2013)
count mean sd min max
Outcome Variables
Annual Change in Total Employment
per cap, 2009-2013 3102 0.00763 0.0340 -0.320 0.576
Annual Change in Private Sector Employment
per cap, 2009-2013 3102 0.01023 0.0336 -0.302 0.570
ARRA Spending Variables
ARRA Research Spending (mill per cap) 3102 0.00003 0.0003 0.000 0.013
ARRA Research Spending in Adjacent Counties
(mill per cap) 3102 0.00005 0.0001 0.000 0.002
All Other ARRA Spending (mill per cap) 3102 0.00082 0.0017 0.000 0.047
Instrumental Variable
Employed in R&D per cap (2007) 3102 0.00030 0.0022 0.000 0.082
County with Employed in R&D (2007) 3102 0.11348 0.3172 0.000 1.000
Doctorate Degrees in a County (2010) 3102 19 109 0.000 2361
County with Research University 3102 0.06544 0.2473 0.000 1.000
Inverse Mills Ratio 1584 0.56940 0.4283 0.000 1.846
Control Variables
Metro County 3102 0.37105 0.4832 0.000 1.000
Change in Total Employment
per cap, 2007-2009 3102 -0.01511 0.0216 -0.180 0.220
Change in Private Sector Employment
per cap, 2007-2009 3102 -0.01599 0.0230 -0.279 0.241
Employed in Manufacturing per cap (2007) 3102 0.04626 0.0436 0.000 0.479
Notes: The table contains summary statistics for baseline regression. The unit of analysis is a county. The sample size is all US counties
for all variables, except inverse Mills ratio. The sample size for inverse Mills ratio is all counties with non-zero ARRA research awards. The
time period for outcome variables and ARRA spending variables is 2009-2013. All outcome variables and ARRA spending variables are scaled
by county population averaged over the same time period. All ARRA spending variables are in millions of USD. ARRA spending on research
is defined using selected CFDA numbers.
County with Research University is an indicator which equals one if a county has R1, R2, or R3 University by the definition in Carnegie
Classification (2010). The inverse Mills ratio is constructed using predicted values from the probit regression of the probability of getting
ARRA research awards on control variables and two instruments: County with Research University and County with Employed in R&D.
Metro County is an indicator variable which takes the value of one if a county is a Metropolitan County by the definition in 2013 Rural-urban
Continuum Codes.
The change in the total number of employed in a county between 2007 and 2009 and the change in the number of employed in the private
sector in a county between 2007 and 2009 are scaled by the average population in a county during this period.
Employed in R&D and Employed in Manufacturing in 2007 are scaled by the county population in 2007.
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Table 2.13: Heckman Correction Results
County with ARRA Research Spending
in 2009-2013
Baseline
dy/dx
Sec Definition
dy/dx
Private Sector
dy/dx
County with Employed in R&D and 0.334∗∗∗ 0.286∗∗∗ 0.331∗∗∗
Science (2007) (0.0441) (0.0328) (0.0441)
County with Research University 0.547∗∗∗ 0.543∗∗∗ 0.546∗∗∗
(0.132) (0.0857) (0.132)
Metro County 0.240∗∗∗ 0.241∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗∗
(0.0159) (0.0138) (0.0160)
ARRA Research Spending in Adjacent 391.8∗∗ 257.0∗∗ 402.9∗∗
Counties (mln per cap, 2009-2013) (159.9) (119.3) (164.4)
All Other ARRA Spending (mln per 4.185 3.398 3.143
cap, 2009-2013) (4.154) (3.159) (4.063)
Employed in Manufacturing per cap 0.937∗∗∗ 0.706∗∗∗ 0.842∗∗∗
(2007) (0.207) (0.180) (0.208)
Change in Employment per cap -1.083∗∗∗ -0.882∗∗ -1.562∗∗∗
(2007-2009) (0.419) (0.372) (0.446)
County-specific Change in 0.359∗∗∗ 0.293∗∗ 0.507∗∗∗
Employment Trend (0.127) (0.114) (0.141)
State FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3102 3102 3056
Notes: The table contains Heckman correction for the selection of counties into receiving ARRA research awards. The first column shows
baseline regression. ARRA spending on research is defined using selected CFDA numbers. The second column shows the same regression
using secondary definition of research spending based on “Where does the money go?” section of the Recovery.gov website. The third column
shows regression using private sector employment, instead of total employment, in the county-specific change in employment trend and the
change in employment per cap (2007-2009).
In all regressions, a county is the unit of analysis. The sample includes all US counties. The outcome variable is a dummy variable for a
county with non-zero ARRA spending on research in 2009-2013.
ARRA spending on research in adjacent counties and all other ARRA spending are included as controls. The variables are in millions of USD
over 2009-2013, divided by the population in a given county averaged over the same period of time.
County with Research University is an indicator which equals one if a county has R1, R2, or R3 University by the definition in Carnegie
Classification (2010). Metro County is an indicator variable which takes the value of one if a county is a Metropolitan County by the definition
in 2013 Rural-urban Continuum Codes. We control for the number of people employed in manufacturing per capita in a county in 2007. We
also include the change in the total number of employed workers in a county between 2007 and 2009 divided by the average population in a
county during this period.
Each regression includes state fixed effects and a county-specific change in employment trend. The trend is a linear extrapolation of the
predicted values from the regression of the change in employment on time. All regressions are calculated separately for each county from 2000
to 2009 in rolling five-year intervals.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
80
Table 2.14: First-Stage Results
ARRA Research Spending
(mln per cap, 2009-2013) Baseline Sec Definition Private Sector
Employed in R&D and science per cap 0.0153∗∗∗ 0.0147∗∗∗ 0.0159∗∗∗
(2007) (0.00311) (0.00350) (0.00308)
Doctoral Degrees in a county (2010, ln) 0.0000185∗∗∗ 0.0000161∗∗∗ 0.0000204∗∗∗
(0.00000447) (0.00000372) (0.00000359)
Inverse Mills Ratio 0.0000350 0.0000214 0.0000340
(0.0000271) (0.0000146) (0.0000213)
Metro County -0.00000813 -0.00000587 0.00000215
(0.0000194) (0.0000139) (0.0000142)
ARRA Research Spending in Adjacent 0.0181 -0.0148 0.0872
Counties (mln per cap, 2009-2013) (0.0899) (0.0774) (0.0652)
All Other ARRA Spending (mln per cap, 0.0153 0.0116 0.00887
2009-2013) (0.0100) (0.00815) (0.00543)
Employed in Manufacturing per cap (2007) 0.000202 0.0000705 0.000218
(0.000232) (0.000175) (0.000224)
Change in Employment per cap (2007-2009) -0.000206 -0.000538 -0.000741
(0.000718) (0.000587) (0.000700)
County-specific Change in Employment 0.000645∗∗ 0.000427 0.000432
Trend (0.000320) (0.000288) (0.000295)
Constant -0.0000622 -0.0000689 -0.000108
(0.0000535) (0.0000449) (0.0000663)
State FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1584 1204 1570
R-sq 0.13 0.20 0.21
Notes: The table contains the first stage of IV regressions. The first column shows baseline regression. ARRA spending on research is
defined using selected CFDA numbers. The second column shows the same regression using secondary definition of research spending based
on “Where does the money go?” section of the Recovery.gov website. The third column shows regression using private sector employment,
instead of total employment, in the county-specific change in employment trend and the change in employment per cap (2007-2009). In all
regressions, a county is the unit of analysis. The sample includes all US counties receiving ARRA Research stimulus in 2009-2013. The
outcome variable is ARRA spending on research from 2009 to 2013. ARRA spending on research in adjacent counties and all other ARRA
spending are included as controls. All three variables are in millions of USD over 2009-2013, divided by the population in a given county
averaged over the same period of time.
ARRA spending on research is an endogeneous variable. It is instrumented by a natural logarithm of the number of doctoral degrees awarded
at the universities in a county, the number of individuals employed in R&D and scientific services per capita in 2007, and a Heckman correction
term. The Heckman correction term is an inverse Mills ratio of predicted values from the probit regression of the probability of receiving
ARRA research stimulus on all control variables and two other instruments: dummies for a county with research university and a county with
employed in R&D and science in 2007.
Metro County is an indicator variable which takes the value of one if a county is a Metropolitan County by the definition in 2013 Rural-urban
Continuum Codes. We also control for the number of people employed in manufacturing per capita in a county in 2007 and the change in the
total number of employed workers in a county between 2007 and 2009 divided by the average population in a county during this period.
Each regression includes state fixed effects and a county-specific change in employment trend. The trend is a linear extrapolation of the
predicted values from the regression of the change in employment on time. All regressions are calculated separately for each county from 2000
to 2009 in rolling five-year intervals.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 2.15: Total Employment Baseline Results
Change in Employment per cap, 2009-2013 OLS
IV
Baseline
IV
Sec def
IV
Priv sec
ARRA Research Spending (mill per cap, 14.14∗∗∗ 26.75∗∗∗ 27.34∗∗∗ 22.95∗∗∗
2009-2013) (1.289) (7.949) (9.747) (6.615)
ARRA Research Spending in Adjacent 0.319 0.984∗∗ 1.202∗∗ 0.915∗∗
Counties (mill per cap, 2009-2013) (0.408) (0.390) (0.561) (0.396)
All Other ARRA Spending (mill per cap, -0.522 -1.484∗∗ -1.589∗∗ -1.219∗∗
2009-2013) (0.358) (0.578) (0.672) (0.474)
Change in Employment per cap (2007-2009) -0.0785 -0.0124 0.0403 -0.0469
(0.0908) (0.0652) (0.0724) (0.0690)
Employed in Manufacturing per cap (2007) 0.0268 0.0780∗∗ 0.0981∗∗∗ 0.0665∗∗
(0.0286) (0.0327) (0.0360) (0.0302)
Metro County 0.00669∗∗∗ 0.00673∗∗∗ 0.00814∗∗∗ 0.00562∗∗∗
(0.00139) (0.00186) (0.00171) (0.00180)
County-specific change in employment trend 0.0215 0.0278 0.0187 0.0217
(0.0214) (0.0329) (0.0318) (0.0348)
Constant 0.0157∗∗∗
(0.00476)
State FE Yes Absorbed Absorbed Absorbed
Observations 3102 1584 1204 1570
Robust First-Stage F 17.39 20.64 27.81
Overidentification test 0.99 0.21 0.88
Notes: The first column shows endogeneous OLS regression. The second column shows the second stage of the baseline IV regression.
ARRA spending on research is defined using selected CFDA numbers. The third column shows the same regression as the one in the second
column using secondary definition of research spending based on “Where does the money go?” section of the Recovery.gov website. The fourth
column shows regression with private sector employment, instead of total employment, in the outcome variable as well as the county-specific
change in employment trend and the change in employment per cap (2007-2009).
In all regressions, a county is the unit of analysis. The sample in the first column includes all US counties. The sample in columns 2-4
includes all US counties receiving ARRA research stimulus in 2009-2013. The outcome variable is the change in employment from 2009 to
2013 divided by the population averaged over the same period of time.
ARRA spending on research is an exogeneous variable in the first column and an endogeneous variable in columns 2-4. It is instrumented by a
natural logarithm of the number of doctoral degrees awarded at the universities in a county, the number of individuals employed in R&D and
scientific services per capita in 2007, and a Heckman correction term. The Heckman correction term is an inverse Mills ratio of the predicted
values from the probit regression of the probability of receiving ARRA research stimulus on all control variables and two other instruments:
dummies for a county with research university and a county with employed in R&D and science in 2007. ARRA spending on research in
adjacent counties and all other ARRA spending are included as controls. All three variables are in millions of USD paid in 2009-2013, divided
by the population averaged over the same period of time. Additionally, ARRA spending on research in adjacent counties is scaled by the
average of the ratio of the population in adjacent counties to the population of the focal county to simplify coefficient interpretation.
County with research university is an indicator which equals one if a county has R1, R2, or R3 University by the definition in Carnegie
Classification (2010). Metro County is an indicator variable which takes the value of one if a county is a Metropolitan County by the
definition in 2013 Rural-urban Continuum Codes. We also control for the number of people employed in manufacturing per capita in a county
in 2007 and the change in the total number of employed workers in a county between 2007 and 2009, divided by the average population in a
county during this period.
OLS regression in Column 1 includes state fixed effects. Instrumental variable regressions in Columns 2-4 have state fixed effects absorbed
to allow for standard errors to be clustered at the state level.
Each regression includes a change in employment trend. The trend is a linear extrapolation of the predicted values from the regression of the
change in employment on time. All regressions are calculated separately for each county from 2000 to 2009 in rolling five-year intervals.
Robust standard errors clustered on state are in parentheses.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 2.17: Total Employment Results without Selection Stage
Change in Employment per cap, 2009-2013
IV
Baseline
IV
Sec def
IV
Priv sec
ARRA Research Spending (mill per cap, 35.65∗∗∗ 38.30∗∗∗ 31.78∗∗∗
2009-2013) (9.473) (12.36) (7.729)
ARRA Research Spending in Adjacent 0.265 0.666 0.204
Counties (mill per cap, 2009-2013) (0.393) (0.506) (0.371)
All Other ARRA Spending (mill per cap, -0.622 -0.388 -0.555
2009-2013) (0.388) (0.490) (0.366)
Change in Employment per cap (2007-2009) -0.0705 -0.0711 -0.0999
(0.0904) (0.0906) (0.103)
Employed in Manufacturing per cap (2007) 0.0249 0.0268 0.0157
(0.0279) (0.0286) (0.0291)
Metro County 0.00624∗∗∗ 0.00624∗∗∗ 0.00503∗∗∗
(0.00138) (0.00139) (0.00133)
County-specific change in employment trend 0.0150 0.0175 0.00544
(0.0225) (0.0231) (0.0266)
State FE Absorbed Absorbed Absorbed
Observations 3102 3102 3056
Robust First-Stage F 47.62 46.76 55.07
Overidentification test 0.57 0.41 0.86
Notes: The table contains the second stage of the IV regressions in Table 2.15 on a sample of all US counties with omitted selection
stage. The unit of analysis is a county. ARRA spending on research is defined using selected CFDA numbers.
Robust standard errors clustered on state are in parentheses.
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 2.18: Split Sample Results
Change in Employment per cap,
2009-2013
No California,
Massachusetts
Counties without
Research Universities
No Nevada,
Alaska
No Top 25 ARRA
Research Counties
ARRA Research Spending (mill per 25.24∗∗∗ 17.95∗∗∗ 26.78∗∗∗ 21.39∗∗∗
cap, 2009-2013) (7.796) (6.754) (7.413) (6.965)
ARRA Research Spending in Adjacent 0.867∗∗ 0.710∗∗ 0.852∗∗ 0.915∗∗
Counties (mill per cap, 2009-2013) (0.383) (0.356) (0.374) (0.388)
All Other ARRA Spending (mill per -1.459∗∗∗ -1.372∗∗∗ -1.555∗∗∗ -1.391∗∗∗
cap, 2009-2013) (0.567) (0.521) (0.593) (0.524)
Change in Employment per cap -0.0108 -0.0133 -0.0181 -0.00435
(2007-2009) (0.0643) (0.0703) (0.0700) (0.0634)
Employed in Manufacturing per cap 0.0765∗∗ 0.0785∗∗ 0.0791∗∗ 0.0809∗∗
(2007) (0.0329) (0.0341) (0.0366) (0.0323)
Metro County 0.00660∗∗∗ 0.00689∗∗∗ 0.00687∗∗∗ 0.00657∗∗∗
(0.00191) (0.00179) (0.00190) (0.00186)
County-specific change in employment 0.0242 0.0293 0.0318 0.0291
trend (0.0323) (0.0325) (0.0337) (0.0316)
State FE Absorbed Absorbed Absorbed Absorbed
Observations 1523 1382 1560 1559
Robust First-Stage F 14.56 13.69 28.35 11.63
Overidentification test 0.96 0.86 0.99 1.00
Notes: The table shows the second stage of the baseline IV regression on split samples. The sample in the first column excludes counties
in Massachusetts and California. The sample in the second column excludes all counties with research universities. The sample in the third
column excludes counties in Nevada and Alaska. Finally, the sample in the fourth column excludes the top 25 counties with the highest
ARRA research spending.
In all regressions, a county is the unit of analysis. The sample includes the counties with non-zero ARRA research awards. ARRA spending
on research is defined using selected CFDA numbers. The outcome variable is the change in employment from 2009 to 2013 divided by the
population averaged over the same period of time.
ARRA spending on research is an endogeneous variable. It is instrumented by the natural logarithm of the number of doctoral degrees awarded
at the universities located in a county, the number of individuals employed in R&D and scientific services per capita in 2007, and a Heckman
correction term. The Heckman correction term is an inverse Mills ratio of predicted values from the probit regression of the probability of
receiving ARRA research stimulus on all control variables and two other instruments: dummies for a county with research university and a
county with employed in R&D and science in 2007. The dummy for a county with research university is omitted from the construction of
Heckman correction term because the sample excludes counties with research universities. County with Research University is an indicator
which equals one if a county has R1, R2, or R3 University by the definition in Carnegie Classification (2010).
ARRA spending on research in adjacent counties and all other ARRA spending are included as controls. All three variables are in millions
of USD paid in 2009-2013, divided by the population averaged over the same period of time. Additionally, ARRA spending on research in
adjacent counties is scaled by the average of the ratio of the population in adjacent counties to the population of the focal county to simplify
coefficient interpretation.
The state fixed effects are absorbed to allow for standard errors to be clustered at the state level.
Metro County is an indicator variable which takes the value of one if a county is a Metropolitan County by the definition in 2013 Rural-urban
Continuum Codes. We also control for the number of people employed in manufacturing per capita in a county in 2007 and the change in the
total number of employed workers in a county between 2007 and 2009, divided by the average population in a county during this period.
Each regression includes a change in employment trend. The trend is a linear extrapolation of the predicted values from the regression of the
change in employment on time. All regressions are calculated separately for each county from 2000 to 2009 in rolling five-year intervals.
Robust standard errors clustered on state are in parentheses.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 2.19: Change in Total Employment from 2009
Change in Employment per cap 2009-2010 2009-2011 2009-2012 2009-2013
ARRA Research Spending 4.219 16.37∗∗∗ 18.87∗∗∗ 26.75∗∗∗
(mill per cap) (4.836) (4.806) (5.455) (7.949)
ARRA Research Spending in 0.0546 0.326 0.796∗∗∗ 0.984∗∗
Adjacent Counties (mill per cap) (0.158) (0.254) (0.284) (0.390)
Observations 1584 1584 1584 1584
Robust First-Stage F 21.71 17.16 18.01 17.39
Overidentification test 0.02 0.05 0.73 0.99
Notes: The table contains the regression coefficients used in calculating the cost of a job-year. Each column is the second stage of the
baseline IV regression on a different outcome variable. The outcome variable is the change in employment over the time period at the top of
each column divided by the population in a given county averaged over the same period of time.
The unit of analysis is a county. ARRA spending on research is defined using selected CFDA numbers. The sample includes all US counties
with non-zero ARRA research awards.
Robust standard errors clustered on state are in parentheses.
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Table 2.20: Change in Total Employment from 2009 (Endogeneous Regression)
Change in Employment per cap 2009-2010 2009-2011 2009-2012 2009-2013
ARRA Research Spending 2.072∗∗∗ 4.870∗∗∗ 8.643∗∗∗ 14.14∗∗∗
(mill per cap) (0.491) (0.585) (0.714) (1.289)
ARRA Research Spending in -0.00389 0.0121 0.277 0.319
Adjacent Counties (mill per cap) (0.151) (0.286) (0.353) (0.408)
Observations 3102 3102 3102 3102
R-sq 0.06 0.09 0.11 0.12
Notes: The table contains the regression coefficients used in calculating the cost of a job-year. Each column is an endogeneous regression
as in Column 1 of Table 2.15 on a different outcome variable. The outcome variable is the change in employment over the time period at the
top of each column divided by the population in a given county averaged over the same period of time.
The unit of analysis is a county. ARRA spending on research is defined using selected CFDA numbers. The sample includes all US counties.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 2.21: State-Level Results
Change in Employment per cap, 2009-2013 OLS
IV
Baseline
IV
Sec def
IV
Priv sec
ARRA Research Spending (mill per cap, 17.68 51.65 41.09 33.76
2009-2013) (58.31) (96.06) (86.38) (90.62)
All Other ARRA Spending (mill per cap, 6.928 4.832 6.450 4.481
2009-2013) (4.992) (6.608) (4.410) (6.096)
Change in Employment per cap (2007-2009) -0.0843 -0.0533 -0.0809 -0.0942
(0.397) (0.343) (0.340) (0.352)
Employed in Manufacturing per cap (2007) -0.222 -0.233 -0.194 -0.235
(0.229) (0.195) (0.202) (0.184)
Number of Metro Counties in a State 0.0000284 0.0000203 0.0000393 0.0000433
(0.000168) (0.000143) (0.000144) (0.000136)
State-specific change in employment trend 0.213 0.201 0.200 0.201
(0.150) (0.130) (0.135) (0.127)
Constant 0.0117 0.0116 0.00956 0.0153
(0.0152) (0.0121) (0.0123) (0.0117)
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 51 51 51 51
Robust First-Stage F 12.82 21.15 13.06
Notes: The first column shows endogeneous OLS regression. The second column shows the second stage of the baseline IV regression.
ARRA spending on research is defined using selected CFDA numbers. The third column shows the same regression using secondary definition
of research spending based on “Where does the money go?” section of the Recovery.gov website. The fourth column shows regression with
private sector employment, instead of total employment, in the outcome variable as well as the state-specific change in employment trend
and the change in employment per cap (2007-2009).
In all regressions, a state is the unit of analysis. The outcome variable is the change in employment from 2009 to 2013 divided by the
population averaged over the same period of time.
ARRA spending on research is an exogeneous variable in the first column and an endogeneous variable in columns 2-4. It is instrumented by
the number of doctoral degrees awarded at the universities in a state and the number of individuals employed in R&D and scientific services
per capita in 2007.
All other ARRA spending is included as controls. The two spending variables are in millions of USD paid in 2009-2013, divided by the
population averaged over the same period of time.
The Number of Metro Counties in a State is a count variable capturing the number of counties corresponding to the definition of Metropolitan
County in 2013 Rural-urban Continuum Codes. We also control for the number of people employed in manufacturing per capita in a state in
2007 and the change in the total number of employed workers in a state between 2007 and 2009, divided by the average population in a state
during this period.
Each regression includes region fixed effects and a change in employment trend. The trend is a linear extrapolation of the predicted values
from the regression of the change in employment on time. All regressions are calculated separately for each state from 2000 to 2009 in rolling
five-year intervals.
Conventional standard errors in parentheses.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
87
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Acemoglu, D. and J. D. Angrist (2001). Consequences of employment protection? the
case of the americans with disabilities act. Journal of Political Economy 109 (5), 915–
957.
Arcidiacono, P. (2018). Expert report for students for fair admissions, inc. v. harvard.
Technical report.
Auerbach, A. J. and Y. Gorodnichenko (2012). Measuring the output responses to fiscal
policy. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 4 (2), 1–27.
Baxter, M. and R. G. King (1993). Fiscal policy in general equilibrium. The American
Economic Review , 315–334.
Blinder, A. S. and M. M. Zandi (2010). How the great recession was brought to an end.
Boehm, C. E. (2016). Government spending and durable goods. Working paper .
Card, D. (2017). Expert report for students for fair admissions, inc. v. harvard. Technical
report.
Chodorow-Reich, G. (2017). Geographic cross-sectional fiscal spending multipliers: What
have we learned? National Bureau of Economic Research.
Chodorow-Reich, G., L. Feiveson, Z. Liscow, and W. G. Woolston (2012). Does state fiscal
relief during recessions increase employment? Evidence from the American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 4 (3), 118–45.
Clark, C. S. (2015, Sep). Historic effort to track stimulus spending wraps up. Government
Executive.
Congressional Budget Office (2012, February). Estimated impact of the American Re-
covery and Reinvestment Act on employment and economic output from October 2011
through December 2011. Congressional Budget Office.
88
Conley, T. G. and B. Dupor (2013). The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act:
Solely a government jobs program? Journal of monetary Economics 60 (5), 535–549.
D’Angelo, L. (2016). 2016 top list of black models. Vogue Italia. Accessed: 2017-10-30.
DeLeire, T. (2000). The wage and employment effects of the americans with disabilities
act. Journal of Human Resources , 693–715.
Dezso˝, C. L., D. G. Ross, and J. Uribe (2016). Is there an implicit quota on women in top
management? a large-sample statistical analysis. Strategic Management Journal 37 (1),
98–115.
Dinerstein, M. F., C. M. Hoxby, J. Meer, and P. Villanueva (2014). Did the fiscal stimulus
work for universities? In How the Financial Crisis and Great Recession Affected Higher
Education, pp. 263–320. University of Chicago Press.
Dustmann, C., A. Glitz, U. Scho¨nberg, and H. Bru¨cker (2015). Referral-based job search
networks. The Review of Economic Studies 83 (2), 514–546.
Feyrer, J. and B. Sacerdote (2011). Did the stimulus stimulate? Real time estimates
of the effects of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. National Bureau of
Economic Research.
Fryer, Jr, R. G. (2009). Implicit quotas. The Journal of Legal Studies 38 (1), 1–20.
Giuliano, L., D. I. Levine, and J. Leonard (2009). Manager race and the race of new
hires. Journal of Labor Economics 27 (4), 589–631.
Godart, F. C. and A. Mears (2009). How do cultural producers make creative decisions?
lessons from the catwalk. Social Forces 88 (2), 671–692.
Harmon, K. (2010, Feb). Is the Recovery Act stimulating science and the economy?
Scientific American.
Hausman, N. (2012). University innovation, local economic growth, and entrepreneurship.
Hourihan, M. (2015). Historical trends in federal R&D. Washington DC: The Ameri-
can Association for the Advancement of Science.(AAAS Report XXXIX, Research and
Development FY 2014), 23–28.
Jones, G. and D. M. Rothschild (2011). Did stimulus dollars hire the unemployed?
Answers to questions about the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. Working
paper .
Kanter, R. M. (1977a). Men and women of the corporation. Basic Books.
89
Kanter, R. M. (1977b). Some effects of proportions on group life: Skewed sex ratios and
responses to token women. American Journal of Sociology 82 (5), 965–990.
Keynes, J. M. (1936). General theory of employment, interest and money. Macmillan.
Lang, K. (1986). A language theory of discrimination. The Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 101 (2), 363–382.
Leduc, S. and D. Wilson (2013). Are state governments roadblocks to federal stimulus?
Evidence from highway grants in the 2009 Recovery Act. Federal Reserve Bank of San
Francisco Working Paper 16.
Leonard, J. S. (1990). The impact of affirmative action regulation and equal employment
law on black employment. The Journal of Economic Perspectives 4 (4), 47–63.
Mau, D. (2014). How much it costs to show at new york fashion week? Fashionista.
Accessed: 2017-10-30.
Mears, A. (2008). Discipline of the catwalk: Gender, power and uncertainty in fashion
modeling. Ethnography 9 (4), 429–456.
Mears, A. (2010). Size zero high-end ethnic: Cultural production and the reproduction
of culture in fashion modeling. Poetics 38, 21–46.
Mears, A. (2011a). Pricing beauty: The making of a fashion model. Univ of California
Press.
Mears, A. (2011b). Pricing looks: Circuits of value in fashion modeling markets. In The
worth of goods: Valuation and pricing in the economy.
Moore-Karim, A. (2016). How “black models matter” became more than a viral street
style message. Fashionista. Accessed: 2017-10-30.
Nakamura, E. and J. Steinsson (2014). Fiscal stimulus in a monetary union: Evidence
from US regions. American Economic Review 104 (3), 753–92.
Nisita, L. (2013). What models really get paid for fashion week. Refinery29 . Accessed:
2017-11-13.
Odell, A. (2013). Fashion models finally earn money after pleas for cash. BuzzFeed .
Accessed: 2017-10-30.
Oyer, P. and S. Schaefer (2002). Sorting, quotas, and the civil rights act of 1991: who
hires when it’s hard to fire? The Journal of Law and Economics 45 (1), 41–68.
90
Oyer, P. and S. Schaefer (2010). Personnel economics: hiring and incentives. Technical
report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Oyer, P. and S. Schaefer (2012). Firm/employee matching: An industry study of american
lawyers. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Phelps, E. S. (1972). The statistical theory of racism and sexism. The American Economic
Review 62 (4), 659–661.
Pilkington, E. (2007). Supermodels launch anti-racism protest. The Guardian. Accessed:
2017-10-30.
Reich, M., D. M. Gordon, and R. C. Edwards (1973). A theory of labor market segmen-
tation. The American Economic Review 63 (2), 359–365.
Safronova, V., J. Nikas, and N. Osipova (2017). What it’s truly like to be a fashion
model. The New York Times . Accessed: 2017-10-30.
Sauers, J. (2013). Dior, chanel, prada, gucci, ysl: Who’s the most diverse? Accessed:
2017-10-30.
Schumpeter, J. A. (1942). Capitalism, socialism and democracy. Harper and Brothers.
Serrato, J. C. S. and P. Wingender (2016). Estimating local fiscal multipliers. National
Bureau of Economic Research.
Sørensen, J. B. (2004). The organizational demography of racial employment segregation.
American Journal of Sociology 110 (3), 626–671.
Tai, C. (2017). Diversity report: The fall 2017 ads were more inclusive than the runways
for the first time ever. The Fashion Spot . Accessed: 2017-10-30.
Teeman, T. (2013). Chanel iman: modelling, racism, and me. Accessed: 2018-12-28.
von Furstenberg, D. and S. Kolb (2016). New york fashion week memo. CFDA. Accessed:
2017-10-30.
Weinberg, B. A., J. Owen-Smith, R. F. Rosen, L. Schwarz, B. M. Allen, R. E. Weiss, and
J. Lane (2014). Science funding and short-term economic activity. Science 344 (6179),
41–43.
Welch, F. (1976). Employment quotas for minorities. Journal of Political Economy 84 (4,
Part 2), S105–S141.
Williams, K. Y. and C. A. O’Reilly III (1998). Demography and diversity in organizations:
A review of 40 years of research. Research in Organizational Behavior 20, 77–140.
91
Wilson, D. J. (2012). Fiscal spending jobs multipliers: Evidence from the 2009 American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 4 (3),
251–82.
Woodford, M. (2011). Simple analytics of the government expenditure multiplier. Amer-
ican Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 3 (1), 1–35.
92
